Market Reactions to Tangible and Intangible Information by Kent Daniel & Sheridan Titman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Nick Barberis, George Buckley, Mike Cooper, Gene Fama, Josef Lakonishook, Mitchell Petersen,
Canice Prendergast, Andrei Shleifer, Walter Torous, Linda Vincent, Tuomo Vuolteenaho and seminar participants
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, MIT, Notre Dame, Stanford, the University of Arizona, UBC, UC
Berkeley, the University of Chicago and the NBER Behavioral Finance Meetings, the LSE Conference on Market
Rationality, the 2001 EFMA meetings, and the Burridge Investment Conference at the University of Colorado
for helpful discussions, comments and suggestions. We especially thank Kenneth French for assistance with data,
and for comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Kent Daniel and Sheridan Titman.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to
the source.Market Reactions to Tangible and Intangible Information
Kent Daniel and Sheridan Titman




We decompose stock returns into components attributable to tangible and intangible information. A
firm's tangible return is the component of its return attributable to fundamental accounting-performance
information, and its intangible return is the component which is orthogonal to this information. Our
evidence indicates that intangible information reliably predicts future stock returns. However, in contrast
to previous research, we find that tangible returns have no forecasting power. The premia associated
with intangible information pose challenges for both traditional asset pricing models and models based
on psychological factors.
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During the past decade, ﬁnancial economists have puzzled over two related observations.
The ﬁrst is that over long horizons, future stock returns are negatively related to past stock
returns. The second is that stock returns are positively related to price-scaled variables,
such as the book-to-market ratio.1
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) were the ﬁrst to document the long-horizon return
reversal evidence. They argue that the evidence supports psychological theories that sug-
gest that individuals tend to overreact to information. By looking at speciﬁc accounting
based information, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, LSV) provide further support
for this hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that future returns are negatively related to
past sales growth, suggesting that investors overreact to the information embedded in
sales growth rates.
As Fama and French (1993, 1995) stress, since changes in fundamental performance
are likely to be associated with changes in risk, this evidence is also potentially consistent
with a risk-based explanation. They argue that high book-to-market and low past return
ﬁrms are distressed and hence riskier, and the higher average returns earned by these
ﬁrms are compensation for this risk. Fama and French (1996) provide evidence that the
long-horizon return reversal eﬀect is subsumed by the stronger book-to-market eﬀect. In
addition, they argue that both return premia result from covariation with a priced-risk
factor, a proxy for which is the return of their HML portfolio, a zero investment portfolio
that consists of long positions in high book-to-market stocks and short positions in low
book-to-market stocks.2
While these behavioral and risk-based explanations are very diﬀerent, both are based
on the idea that high future stock returns are related to poor past fundamental per-
formance. In one case, investors overreact to fundamentals, and in the other, risk is
negatively related to past fundamental performance (or distress). In this paper we show
that neither of these interpretations is quite right. Speciﬁcally, we show that future re-
turns are unrelated to past fundamental performance, where fundamental performance is
measured using standard accounting growth measures of ﬁrm performance.
To understand this ﬁnding, note that while there is a negative correlation between the
book-to-market ratio and past accounting growth measures (i.e. high BM ﬁrms are indeed
1We review this literature in Section II.
2However, Daniel and Titman (1997) point out that the Fama and French empirical results are also
consistent with mispricing-based models.
1generally distressed, as Fama and French (1995) and LSV document), not all high book-
to-market ﬁrms are distressed. For example, a ﬁrm can become a high book-to-market
ﬁrm as a result of either high earnings growth (which pushes up book), or a relatively
low past return (which pushes down the market price). Thus, it is conceivable that the
book-to-market eﬀect could be generated by underreaction rather than overreaction to
the information in past earnings.3 For example, much of the accounting information
(e.g., earnings or book value growth) of the Internet ﬁrms in the late 1990s was consis-
tent with ﬁnancial distress. However, since other information about their future growth
opportunities were viewed very favorably, they had extremely low book-to-market ratios.
To the extent that the subsequent low returns of Internet stocks can be characterized as
resulting from previous overreaction, the culprit is overreaction to this other information,
which we will call intangible information, and not to the tangible accounting information
that has been discussed in the above-cited literature.4
To explore these issues in more detail, we provide a breakdown of the information
that moves stock prices into two components: tangible and intangible information.5 The
Oxford English Dictionary deﬁnes a tangible property or form as “That can be laid hold
of or grasped by the mind, or dealt with as a fact.” and intangible “... That cannot be
grasped mentally.” Consistent with this, we deﬁne tangible information as performance
information like sales, earnings and cash ﬂow growth, which can be extracted from the
ﬁrms’ accounting statements. We deﬁne intangible information as the other determinants
of a stock’s past return. Correspondingly, we deﬁne tangible returns as the component
of returns that can be linked directly to these accounting growth numbers. Intangible
returns, in contrast, presumably reﬂect changes in expectations about future cash ﬂows
or discount rates.
Figure 1 illustrates our calculation of tangible and intangible returns.6 Each year,
we perform a cross-sectional regression of ﬁrms’ past 5-year log-returns on a variety of
fundamental growth measures (unanticipated book-value, earnings, cash-ﬂow, and sales
growth, or all of these). For a given ﬁrm at a given point in time, we calculate log( ˆ Pt) –
its expected log price at time t conditional on log(Pt−5) and on its unanticipated funda-
3There is however, some evidence consistent with underreaction to fundamentals at shorter horizons,
for example post-earnings announcement drift (see, for example Rendleman, Jones, and Latane (1982)
and Bernard and Thomas (1989).
4What we are calling tangible and intangible information should not be confused with what accoun-
tants call tangible and intangible assets, which refer to assets that cannot be objectively valued.
5In Appendix B, we provide a simple model that further motivates our decomposition.
6The assumption here is that the log-price per share change is equal to the log return. In our empirical
tests, we will do these calculations on a adjusted per-share basis, as described in Section A.
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Figure 1: Graphical illustration of the breakdown of a ﬁrm’s past return into tangible and
intangible returns.
mental growth between t − 5 and t. We deﬁne a given ﬁrm’s tangible return as the ﬁtted
component of this cross-sectional regression, illustrated by the dashed line in the ﬁgure,
and the intangible return as the residual. One can think of the tangible return as the past
5-year stock return that would be expected based solely on the past fundamental-growth
measures. The intangible return is then the part of this past return that remains unex-
plained, and presumably is the result of investor response to information not contained
in the accounting-growth measures we use.
Empirically, we ﬁnd that we can explain a substantial fraction of the cross-section
of past realized returns with these accounting-growth measures. The average R2s in our
cross-sectional regressions range up to 60%, depending on the fundamental performance
measures used. This is not surprising: past stock returns, especially over a relatively
long-horizon like 5 years, should be closely linked to fundamental performance. Also not
surprising is that we ﬁnd a strong positive relation between intangible returns and future
fundamental performance measures: a ﬁrm’s intangible return does, at least partially,
reﬂect information about its future growth prospects.
What is more interesting is what we uncover about the relation of future returns to
tangible and intangible information. In particular, we ﬁnd no evidence of any link between
past tangible information and future returns, which is in sharp contrast to previous results
(e.g., those in LSV) and to the usual risk-based and behavioral interpretations of the
3reversal and book-to-market eﬀect discussed earlier. In addition, we ﬁnd a strong negative
relation between past intangible returns and future returns. In other words, evidence of
return reversals are generated solely by the reversal of the intangible component of returns.
As we shall show, this explains why the book-to-market eﬀect subsumes the DeBondt and
Thaler (1995) reversal eﬀect.
In addition to investigating the accounting and stock return-based measures of intan-
gible information, we introduce what we call the composite share issuance variable. This
variable measures the quantity of shares the ﬁrm issues (or repurchases) in exchange for
cash or services. Thus, seasoned issues, employee stock option plans, and share-based ac-
quisitions increase the issuance measure, while repurchases, dividends and other actions
which take cash out of the ﬁrm reduce the issuance measure.
There are two rationales for introducing this variable. The ﬁrst has to do with recon-
ciling our results with the seemingly contradictory results in LSV. As we will discuss later
in the paper, LSV’s measure of sales growth is the ﬁrm’s total sales growth, and therefore
incorporates both internally and externally funded growth. As an example of the latter, a
ﬁrm could double its sales by doing a stock-ﬁnanced merger with a ﬁrm with equal sales.
We argue that the two sources of growth are fundamentally diﬀerent, and that to properly
interpret the LSV results, one must separate the eﬀects of these two sources of growth.
We do so, and ﬁnd that future returns are unrelated to internally-funded growth in sales,
earnings, cash ﬂow or book value. However, future returns are strongly negatively associ-
ated with share issuance. Based on this, we conclude that if this return predictability is
a result of overreaction, it is not a result of investor overreaction to tangible performance
information, but rather a result of underreaction to the manager’s decision to issue.
In addition, our issuance variable is of interest because it is likely to capture com-
ponents of intangible information that are not accounted for in our accounting-based
variables. Indeed, the composite issuance variable is strongly positively correlated with
our accounting-based measure of past intangible returns, suggesting that there is a com-
mon component that drives both variables. Speciﬁcally, managers tend to issue shares
following the realization of favorable intangible information and repurchase shares follow-
ing the realization of unfavorable intangible information. One interpretation of this is
that favorable intangible returns reﬂect the arrival of proﬁtable investment opportunities,
perhaps as a result of decreases in the ﬁrm’s discount rate, which may require external
funding. An alternative interpretation is that positive intangible returns reﬂect mispric-
ing, providing ﬁrms with the opportunity to improve their value by timing the equity
4market, i.e., issuing shares when they are overpriced and repurchasing shares when they
are underpriced.7 Regardless, if managers have information about the magnitude of the
intangible information that is not reﬂected in our accounting-based measures, then the
composite issuance variable will capture a component of the intangible return that would
not otherwise be captured.
To test whether this second measure of intangible information provides additional ex-
planatory power we include the composite issuance variable in multiple regressions that
also include accounting-based proxies for tangible and intangible information. In these
multiple regressions, the composite share issuance variable is signiﬁcantly negatively re-
lated to future returns, providing further evidence that stock prices perform well (poorly)
subsequent to the realization of unfavorable (favorable) intangible information.
Our evidence that future returns are negatively related to past intangible returns
suggests that intangible returns either contain information about mispricing, or about
the future risk and discount rate of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows. There are several reasons why
intangible returns might reﬂect risk. It is possible that as the expected cash ﬂows from
growth options grow – reﬂected by high intangible returns – their risk declines. A second
possibility is that changes in risk/discount rates are uncorrelated with information about
future cash ﬂows. In this case a negative shock to a ﬁrm’s discount rate would result in
a high current return, one we would label as an intangible return, and would be followed
by a subsequent low (expected) return, consistent with our evidence.
Of course, the implication of any such risk-based model would be that intangible
returns forecast the covariance of ﬁrm returns with priced risk factors. Consequently, we
examine whether return covariances behave in a way consistent with this explanation. In
short, we ﬁnd no support for such an explanation. Indeed, ﬁrms with high past intangible
returns actually have higher market betas. However, as usual, this may very well mean
that the rational expectations framework is correct, but that we have the wrong risk
factors. It is possible that future tests will uncover economically plausible risk-factors
which explain the average returns of these portfolios.
There are also behavioral explanations for why returns might be related to the past
realization of tangible and intangible information. For example, the psychology literature
7The empirical evidence in Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) indicate that ﬁrms tend to re-
purchase (issue) shares when their stock prices perform poorly (well) relative to changes in their cash
ﬂows. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that this tendency reﬂects the fact that managers time the equity
markets. The evidence in Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)
on long run performance following equity issues and repurchases is consistent with the idea that managers
can in fact successfully time the equity markets.
5suggests that individuals react diﬀerently to information that is diﬃcult to interpret.
Speciﬁcally, individuals tend to be more overconﬁdent in settings where more judgment is
required to evaluate information, and where the feedback on the quality of this judgment is
ambiguous in the short run (see, e.g., Einhorn (1980)).8 If this is the case, then we might
expect investors to put too little weight on tangible information relative to intangible
information. We show that this interpretation is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings in
this paper.
The distinction between tangible and intangible information may also be related to
the Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, DHS) distinction between public and
private information. Current earnings are publicly disclosed, while more ambiguous in-
formation about growth opportunities are at least partially collected (or interpreted)
privately by investors. DHS argue that investors are overconﬁdent about the precision of
their private signals and, therefore, in the long run, will overreact to intangible private
information and underreact to tangible public information.9
To put somewhat more structure on this behavioral explanation we provide a simple
model in the appendix, in which risk neutral investor form expectations incorrectly. Con-
sistent with the behavioral evidence cited earlier, the investor overestimates the precision
of the signal he extracts from intangible information, but properly estimates the preci-
sion of the signal extracted from harder tangible information. As the model illustrates,
to a large extent the implications of the behavioral model have direct analogies with the
more traditional risk-based models. For example, risk premia decreasing with favorable
intangible information, which is consistent with our results, have the same implications as
over-reaction to intangible information. Moreover, random changes in risk premia, which
can also generate our results, provides the same implications as stock prices reacting to
8There are two additional papers that we know of that ﬁnd evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Daniel and Titman (1999) ﬁnd that the momentum eﬀect is stronger among growth ﬁrms than among
value ﬁrms, and interpret this as resulting from the fact that more of growth ﬁrms’ value arises from growth
options that must be evaluated subjectively. Also, the evidence in Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis
(1999) suggests that the book-to-market eﬀect is far stronger among ﬁrms with high R&D expenditures.
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) interpret this evidence as consistent with more of the
value of high R&D ﬁrms coming from intangibles, about which investors are more overconﬁdent. Also
related is Klibanoﬀ, Lamont, and Wizman (1999) who ﬁnd evidence of overreaction to what they call
“salient” information.
9The distinction between tangible and intangible information plays less of a role in the model developed
by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, BSV), which was at least partially motivated by the LSV results.
The BSV model is based on the idea that investors misinterpret the pattern of information events, like
earnings announcements. Although their arguments can probably be applied to intangible as well as
tangible information signals, their interpretation is presented in terms of investors overreacting to tangible
information like earnings and sales.
6pure noise. Although we are not able to directly test our behavioral model, we view it as
plausible alternative to the speciﬁc risk-based models that we do test.
II. Related Literature
There is now substantial evidence that individual stock returns are predictable. This
evidence can be divided into three categories. First, there is evidence that past returns
can be used to forecast future returns. At horizons of 3 to 12 months, excess returns
exhibit positive serial correlation or momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), while at
longer horizons of 3 to 5 years, there is evidence of negative serial correlation or reversal.10
In the second category, price-scaled variables, such as the earnings-to-price, dividend-
to-price, cash ﬂow-to-price, the book-to-market ratio, and market-capitalization itself
forecast future returns.11 The ratio that has been most studied in recent years is the
book-to-market ratio. Studies ﬁnd that stocks with high book-to-market ratios have
historically generated much higher returns than stocks with low book-to-market ratios,
and more importantly, that these returns cannot be easily explained with traditional asset
pricing models.12
In the third and ﬁnal category, there are a number of studies that examine the long
term price reaction to speciﬁc information events. These information events can be catego-
rized as either management decisions such as capital structure changes, dividend changes,
and stock splits, or information about ﬁrm performance, such as earnings and sales ﬁg-
ures. There is considerable evidence that investors underreact to information conveyed
by management decisions.13
10See DeBondt and Thaler, (1985, 1987), and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992). In addition, at
very short horizons there is evidence of negative autocorrelation in individual stock returns (Jegadeesh
(1990) and Lehmann (1990)).
11For evidence on e/p, see Basu (1983), Jaﬀe, Keim, and Westerﬁeld (1989). For b/m, see Stattman
(1980), Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985), DeBondt and Thaler (1987), and Fama and French (1992).
For c/p see Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) provide
evidence on c/p and other price-scaled variables in the US and Japan, respectively.
12For example, Daniel and Titman (1997) show that stock returns can be better explained by the
characteristics of the ﬁrm than by the sensitivity of returns to Fama and French (1993) factors (see
also Davis, Fama, and French (2000) and Daniel, Titman, and Wei (2001).) Also the Sharpe-ratios of
strategies based on the size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics are high, especially given
their apparently low correlation of the returns from these strategies with important economic variables.
A variant of the Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) argument shows that this is only possible in a rational
asset pricing model when there is highly variable marginal utility across states (see also MacKinlay (1995)
and Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998).)
13The appendix of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) reviews this evidence, and provides
citations to the original works.
7The decision to issue or repurchase shares is of course a management decision, but
one that is based on past ﬁrm performance, anticipated future performance, and the
ﬁrm’s share price. Empirical evidence suggests that benchmark-adjusted future returns
are lower following “issuance” events (i.e., decisions to exchange ﬁrm ownership for cash
or services), and higher following “repurchase” events which exchange cash for ﬁrm own-
ership, such as repurchases and dividend increases. See, for example Loughran and Ritter
(1997) (seasoned oﬀerings), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) (repurchases),
Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) (dividend initiations and omissions).
The existing evidence on the price reaction to information about ﬁrm performance
depends on the horizon over which returns are measured. For example, there is substan-
tial evidence of short-term underreaction to earnings surprises. However, as we note in
the Introduction, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) provide evidence over longer
horizons that suggests that stock prices overreact to sales and cash ﬂow information as
well as earnings.
III. Decomposition of the Book-to-Market Ratio
As we discussed in the Introduction, our analysis decomposes stock returns into a com-
ponent that can be attributed to tangible information and a second component that can
be attributed to intangible information. Speciﬁcally, the realized return from t − 5 to t
(i.e., the ﬁve year period before our portfolio formation date) is expressed as:
˜ r(t−5,t) = Et−5[˜ r(t−5,t)] + ˜ r
T(t−5,t) + ˜ r
I(t−5,t). (1)
where Et−5[˜ r(t−5,t)] is the expected return at t−5, and ˜ rT and ˜ rI are the unanticipated
returns resulting from (unanticipated) Tangible and Intangible information, respectively.
Our empirical work regresses returns in the current month on proxies for past real-
izations of tangible and intangible returns. The null hypothesis of these regressions, that
current returns are unrelated to past realizations of tangible and intangible returns, is
consistent with a setting where investors have rational expectations and are risk-neutral.
However, if these past returns provide information about a ﬁrm’s riskiness, or alternatively
if investors over- or underreact to information, past tangible and intangible returns may
predict current returns. In Appendix B we present a simple model that explicitly derives
the regression coeﬃcients that arise under various alternatives under which investors over
or under react to information.
8If we interpret accounting growth measures as tangible information, then our distinc-
tion between tangible and intangible returns can be viewed as a distinction between that
portion of a stock’s return that can be explained by accounting growth measures and that
portion that is unrelated to these “fundamental” performance measures. To illustrate





























The book-to-market ratio at time t is deﬁned either as the ratio of the total book-
equity BEt to the total market equity MEt, or as the ratio of the book value per share
Bt to the market value per share (or share price) Pt. We decompose the log of the later
ratio into the τ-period ago log book-to-market ratio, plus the log change in its book value,
minus the log change in its price.
The elements of this book-to-market decomposition are directly related to those of the
tangible/intangible return decomposition given in equation (1). First, bmt−τ serves as a
proxy for both the ﬁrm’s expected return between t − τ and t and, more importantly,
for the expected growth in book value over this period; empirically, high book-to-market
ﬁrms have both higher future accounting growth rates and lower future returns. The log
change in book value will capture both the anticipated and unanticipated growth from
t−τ to t. The unanticipated component of this can be thought of as a proxy for the new
tangible information that arrives between t − τ and t, while (after adjusting for splits,
dividends, etc.) the log change in share price is equal to the log stock return, and will
reﬂect all new information, tangible as well as intangible.
This decomposition is useful because it can help us understand why the log book-
to-market ratio (bmt) tends to predict future returns. Speciﬁcally, by regressing current
returns on the individual components of the decomposition, we can determine whether
the power of the book-to-market ratio to forecast future returns results from a correla-
tion of current returns with past tangible returns, intangible returns, or some long-lived
component of the ﬁrm reﬂected in the lagged book-to-market ratio.
Before running such a regression there are some adjustments that need to be made
so that the elements of the book-to-market decomposition more accurately reﬂect our
deﬁnitions of tangible and intangible returns. A good proxy for new information (both
tangible and intangible) about ﬁrm value is the total return to a dollar invested in the
ﬁrm. Thus, we must ﬁrst convert the change in the market value per share of a ﬁrm’s
9equity to the return on its stock. If there are no splits, dividends, etc., these will be
the same, but in general some adjustment must be made. The relation between the log
returns and price changes are given by the expression:





Ps · fs + Ds
Ps−1
¶
where fs, a price adjustment factor from s−1 to s, adjusts for splits and rights issues. Ds is
the value of all cash distributions paid between time s−1 and s, per-share owned at s−1,
and Ps is the per share value at time s.14 A slight manipulation of this equation shows
that the log return is equal to the log price change plus a cumulative log share adjustment
factor n(t − τ,t), which is equal to the (log of the) number of shares one would have at
time t, per share held at time t − τ, had one reinvested all cash distributions back into
the stock.
















































+ n(t − τ,t) (4)
Substituting expression (4) into equation (2) gives the current log book-to-market
ratio as the sum of the lagged log book-to-market ratio and what we call the book-return,
minus the log return.





+ n(t − τ,t)
| {z }
≡rB(t−τ,t)
−r(t − τ,t) (5)
rB(t − τ,t), the book return between t − τ and t, is intuitively very much like the stock
return: the log stock return is the answer to the question: If I had purchased $1 (market
14We follow CRSP in this deﬁnition. Our fs is equivalent to the CRSP factor to adjust price in period,
See the 2002 CRSP Data Description Guide for the CRSP US Stock Database and CRSP US Indices
Database, pages 77, 84 and 156.
10value) of this stock τ years ago, what would the (log of the) market value of my investment
be today? The log book return instead tells you what the (log of the) book value of your
shares would be today had you purchased $1 worth of book value of this stock τ years
ago.15
If we write the current book-to-market ratio in terms of the stock return and the book
return we obtain:
bmt = bmt−τ + rB(t − τ,t) − r(t − τ,t) (6)
Hence, the current book-to-market ratio can be expressed as the past book-to-market
ratio, plus the log book return, minus the log stock return.
In our empirical work we will investigate the relation between the variables on the
RHS of this equation and future returns. Calculation of the lagged log book-to-market
ratio and the log stock return are straightforward. To calculate the remaining variable,
the log book return, we sum the log change in the book value per share from t − τ to
t and the share adjustment factor n(t − τ,t), following the deﬁnition in equation (5).16
The monthly share adjustment factor each month is calculated using the prices at the
beginning and end of the period, and the return over the period (all from CRSP). From
equation (3), we have that:






Calculating the cumulative adjustment factor n(t − τ,t) then simply involves adding up
the individual ns’s over the period from t − τ to t.
In Section IV we present estimates of regressions of returns on subsets of the variables
on the right hand side of equation (6). Our goals in these regressions are to determine the
relation between current returns and past tangible and intangible returns. To determine
the relation between past tangible and current returns, we regress current returns on rB(t−
5,t) and bmt−5. The estimated coeﬃcient on the book return in this regression measures
whether future returns are related to tangible information. The assumptions underlying
this interpretation are that (1) rB(t−5,t) is not inﬂuenced by intangible information; and
that (2) the lagged book-to-market ratio serves as a control for the expected book return.17
15In both the stock return and book return calculations these calculations assume no additional in-
vestment in the stock, and assume reinvestment of all payouts (such as dividends) at the stock’s market
value at the time the payouts were made.
16An alternative method of calculating the book return is to simply plug the current and lagged book-
to-market ratios and the past return r(t−τ,t) into equation (6). In our programs, we used both methods
and checked for consistency.
17Table 2 shows that the lagged book-to-market ratio and the book return are strongly negatively
correlated, as we would expect.
11As a result, the coeﬃcient on the book return should capture the relation between the
unanticipated book return (i.e. the unanticipated tangible information between t−5 and
t) and the current stock return. Second, we run a regression with all three elements of
the decomposition as independent variables. The past book-to-market ratio and the book
return are assumed to control for tangible returns as well as expected returns, implying
that the coeﬃcient on the past stock returns, in this multiple regression, reveals the
relation between past intangible returns and current stock returns. A detailed derivation
of the expected coeﬃcient estimates from these regressions is given in Appendix B.2
These estimates provide insights about how the observed relation between book-to-
market ratios and returns relates to the tendency of stock prices to over- or under-react
to tangible and intangible information. Using this same approach, we will estimate re-
gressions with components of decompositions of other accounting ratios that have been
shown to predict stock returns. For example, the sales to price ratio can be decomposed
as,
spt = spt−τ + rS(t − τ,t) − r(t − τ,t) (8)
where rS, the change in sales per adjusted share, can be viewed as another proxy for
the tangible return. The components of this decomposition are then used in exactly the
same way as the elements of the book-to-market decomposition to estimate the eﬀect of
tangible and intangible information
Finally, we provide one additional decomposition which motivates our composite share
issuance measure ι(t − τ,t), which we deﬁne below. We construct this measure with
two goals. First, as we discuss in Section V, share issuance should be an additional
proxy for intangible information and, consistent with this hypothesis, we will ﬁnd that
our composite share issuance measure is strongly negatively related to future returns.
Second, we wish to compare our results with those of LSV, who examine how stock prices
react to total growth in sales rather than our sales-return, which is essentially a measure
of per-share change in sales. The diﬀerence between the two measures turns out to be the
share-issuance measure.
We can rewrite the equation for rS, as given in equation (8), as



















where Nt is the total number of shares outstanding at time t, and St·Nt is the ﬁrm’s total
12sales in year t. We can obtain the sales-return, rS, either by adding the adjustment factor
n(t−τ,t) to the log growth of sales-per-share (as is done in equation (5) for book return),
or by subtracting oﬀ what we will call the composite share issuance measure ι(t − τ,t)
from gSLS(t−τ,t) (the total sales growth) as is done in equation (9) above.18 In the former
case, to get a reasonable measure of sales growth per dollar of investment, we must adjust
for stock-splits, etc. The adjustment factor n does this. In the later case, to adjust total
sales growth, splits and stock dividends are not a concern, but share-issues, repurchases
and equivalent actions must be taken into account. The composite share-issuance measure
ι(t − τ,t) does this.
Notice that, based on equations (7) and (9), ι can be written as:
















− r(t − τ,t).
That is, ι(t − τ,t) is the part of the ﬁrm’s market-value growth that isn’t attributable
to stock returns. As such, corporate actions such as splits and stock dividends will leave
ι unchanged. However issuance activity, which includes actual equity issues, employee
stock option plans, or any other actions which trades ownership for cash or for services
(in the case of stock option plans) increases ι. For example, if a ﬁrm were to issue, at the
market price, a number of shares equal in value to 20% of the shares outstanding at the
time, this would increase ι by log(1.2) ≈ 0.18. In contrast, repurchase activity such as
actual share repurchases, dividends, or any other action which pays cash out of the ﬁrm
decreases ι.
In the next section, we examine the extent to which the three components of a ﬁrm’s
book-to-market ratio and composite share issuance individually predict future returns.
IV. Empirical Results
A. The Book-to-Market Decomposition: Empirical Results
This subsection reports estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly
returns on the three components of the book-to-market ratio, as given in equation (6).
18Notice that we can use ι to convert any “total” measure to “return” form. For example r(t−τ,t) =
log(MEt/MEt−τ) − ι(t,t − τ).
13The regressions examine a time lag, τ of ﬁve years, over which we measure the book and
market returns. This corresponds to the time horizons over which there is strong existing
evidence of return reversals.
A.1 Data Construction
Our regression analysis in the next subsection examines various decompositions of each
ﬁrm’s log fundamental-to-price ratios, where the “fundamental” measures include book-
value, sales, cash-ﬂow and earnings. Consistent with the previous literature, we deﬁne a
ﬁrm’s log book-to-market ratio in year t (bmt) as the log of the total book value of the
ﬁrm at the end of the ﬁrms’ ﬁscal year ending anywhere in year t−1 minus the log of the
total market equity on the last trading day of calendar year t − 1, as reported by CRSP.
The other three ratios are deﬁned analogously. Book value, sales, cash-ﬂow, and earnings
are calculated using COMPUSTAT annual data as described in Appendix A.
The 12 cross-sectional regressions of monthly returns from July of year t through June
of year t+1 all use the same set of right-hand-side variables. The minimum six-month lag
between the end of the ﬁscal-year and the date at which the returns are measured is to
ensure that the necessary information from the ﬁrms’ annual reports is publicly available
information.
The variable bmt−5 is analogously deﬁned as the log of the total book value of the
ﬁrm at the end of the ﬁrms’ ﬁscal year ending anywhere in year t − 6, as reported by
COMPUSTAT, minus the log of the total market equity on the last trading day of calendar
year t−6, as reported by CRSP. It is simply bmt lagged 5 years. r(t−5,t) is the cumulative
log return on the stock from the last trading day of calendar year t−6 to the last trading
day of calendar year t−1 and rB(t−5,t) is the log book return, over the same time period,
constructed as discussed in Section III. Finally, rmom is the stock’s 5-month cumulative
log return from the last trading day of calendar year t − 1, to the last trading day of
May of year t. We do not include the return in June of year t because of concerns about
bid-ask bounce.
To be included in any of our regressions for returns from July of year t to June of year
t + 1, we impose the requirement that a ﬁrm have a valid price on CRSP at the end of
June of year t and as of December of year t − 1. We also require that book value for the
ﬁrm be available on COMPUSTAT for the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year ending in year t. For most of
our empirical analysis here, where we utilize past ﬁve-year returns and book returns, we
also require that the book value for the ﬁrm be available on COMPUSTAT for the ﬁrm’s
14ﬁscal year ending in year t − 6, that the ﬁrm have a valid price on CRSP at the end of
December of year t − 6, and that the return on the ﬁrm over the period from December
of year t−6 to December of year t−1 be available. We also exclude all ﬁrms with prices
that fall below ﬁve dollars per share as of the last trading day of June of year t. This is
because of concerns about bid-ask bounce and nontrading among very low price stocks.
Finally, consistent with Fama and French (1993), we exclude all ﬁrms with negative book
values in either year t − 1 or year t − 6, though negative values at intermediate dates do
not result in exclusion. When we do our analysis with alternative fundamental measures
in Section IV.B, we require that those measures (earnings, cash ﬂow, or sales) be positive
as well.19
A.2 Data Summary
Table 2 shows the average cross-sectional correlation coeﬃcients between the variables
we consider.20 Some interesting patterns emerge here. First, bmt and bmt−5 are highly
correlated, indicating that ﬁrms’ book-to-market ratios are highly persistent. Second,
bmt−5 is highly negatively correlated with rB, which indicates that low book-to-market or
growth ﬁrms generally have higher proﬁtability (in the form of book returns) per share
in the future.21 Third the univariate correlation between bmt and r(t − 5,t) is negative
and strong – that is high BM ﬁrms are indeed low past return ﬁrms. But, the correlation
between bmt and rB(t − 5,t) is weak and statistically insigniﬁcant, despite the fact that
the correlation between r(t−5,t) and rB(t−5,t) is strongly positive. This indicates that,
on average, high bm ﬁrms have experienced low past stock returns, rather than having
experienced high book returns. Consistent with this, a multivariate regression of bmt on
rB(t − 5,t) and r(t − 5,t) (not shown) generates strongly statistically signiﬁcant positive
19Needless to say, there are a lot of ﬁrms that are not included in our analysis because we need to
measure book-to-market ratios in ﬁscal year t − 6. Hence, our sample does not include ﬁrms that are
younger than 5.5 years. However, since the returns we calculate are associated with implementable
portfolio strategies, there are no biases associated with our selection criteria.
20The t-statistics presented below each correlation coeﬃcient are the based on the time-series of cross-
sectional correlation coeﬃcients, as in the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Because of the serial-correlation in
the time-series of correlation coeﬃcient, we use a Newey-West procedure with 6 lags to calculate standard
errors.
21This positive correlation is consistent with other ﬁndings, such as Fama and French (1995) and
Vuolteenaho (2002). In particular Vuolteenaho uses a VAR to decompose a ﬁrm’s stock return into
two components: shocks to expected cash ﬂows and shocks to expected returns (or discount rates).
He ﬁnds that the typical ﬁrm’s returns are mainly a result of news about cash ﬂows, as opposed to
future expected returns. He also ﬁnds that shocks to expected-returns and shocks to future cash ﬂows
are positively correlated, meaning that, ex-ante ﬁrms which are expected to have high future cash ﬂow
growth will also have high future expected returns.
15and negative coeﬃcients, respectively. Firms that have experienced past earnings growth
that is not associated with increased stock returns generally have higher book-to-market
ratios, as would be expected.
B. Fama-MacBeth Regression Results – Book-to-Market Decomposition
Table 3 presents the results from a set of Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns
on various components of the book-to-market decomposition. Regression 1, a simple
regression of returns on the log book-to-market ratio, shows that the book-to-market
eﬀect is strong in our sample, which is consistent with the existing literature. Regressions
2 through 8 decompose bmt into its components as speciﬁed in equation (6).
Regression 2 indicates that bmt−5 can still forecast future returns. This evidence is
consistent with the persistence of the book-to-market ratio seen in Table 2. The ability of
the 5-year lagged book-to-market ratio to forecast future returns is consistent with either
bm capturing some permanent ﬁrm characteristic which could be associated either with
actual or perceived risk, or with long-term mispricing. For example, ﬁrms with intangible
assets like patents and brand names which have persistently low book-to-market ratios
may have unique return patterns that are associated with their characteristics. It is also
possible that the risk or mispricing eﬀects captured by bm are temporary, but of longer
duration than 5 years. We do not attempt to discriminate between these two hypotheses.22
The next set of univariate regressions allow us to gauge the extent to which returns are
related to past realizations of tangible and intangible information. Speciﬁcally, Regression
3 shows that the book return, on its own, does not reliably forecast future returns. When
we include bmt−5 in Regression 6, which acts as a control for the expected book return
over t−5 to t, the relation between book returns and future stock returns is even weaker.
This evidence is consistent with the observation that over a ﬁve year period, investors
react appropriately to information about accumulated earnings. However, consistent with
existing evidence, we ﬁnd, in Regression 4, evidence consistent with long-term reversal.23
Regression 5 shows that a ﬁrm’s composite share issuance is strongly negatively associated
with its future returns, something we will discuss more in Section V,
Regressions 6-8 are multiple regressions, which include the lagged book-to-market
22However, the evidence in Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (1999) suggests that high R&D ﬁrms
don’t earn consistently lower returns than ﬁrms with low or no R&D expenditures.
23We ﬁnd a particularly strong long-term reversal eﬀect, because there is a minimum six month gap
between the period over which r(t − 5,t) is calculated, and the returns we are forecasting. The six-
month momentum eﬀect, which we eliminate with this experimental design, reduces the reversal eﬀect as
calculated in DeBondt and Thaler (1985) (see Asness (1995)).
16ratio, the book return, and the past returns. Note that the coeﬃcient on past returns
in Regressions 7 and 8 are just slightly more negative and signiﬁcant than in Regression
4, while in contrast the coeﬃcient on book return is now positive and signiﬁcant, and
the coeﬃcient on the lagged book-to-market ratio is somewhat more positive than in the
univariate regressions. These observations are the same whether we control for issuance or
not. The results of these regressions, in combination with the univariate regressions, are
consistent with the model predictions discussed in Section III when there is overreaction
to intangible information (or equivalently when positive intangible information reﬂects
decreased risk), but no over- nor underreaction to tangible information.
C. Calculating the Intangible Return
The regressions reported in Table 3 ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relation between past tangible and
future returns (Regressions 3 and 5), but a signiﬁcant negative relation between past in-
tangible returns and future returns (Regressions 7 and 8). As discussed in Section B.3, an
alternative way to estimate the model is to ﬁrst orthogonalize the past return with respect
to the lagged fundamental price ratio and the fundamental return. In other words, we
would like to calculate the portion of the stock returns that cannot be explained by funda-
mental accounting variables. We do this by ﬁrst performing cross-sectional regressions at
each time, and deﬁning the residual from this regression as the intangible return. So, for
example, to calculate the book-value based intangible return, we run the cross-sectional
regression:
r(t − 5,5) = γ0 + γBM · bmt−5 + γB · rB(t − 5,5) + ˜ u
and deﬁne the intangible return as the regression residual:
r
I(B)(t − 5,t) ≡ ˜ u.
Table 4 shows the results of running the Fama-MacBeth regressions with both the
intangible (orthogonalized) returns, and with the non-orthogonalized returns. Regressions
1 and 2 in this Table are identical to Regressions 6 and 7 in Table 3. These are included
for comparison with Regression 3. In Regression 3, we include the lagged book-to-market
ratio, the book return, and the intangible return which is the past return orthogonalized
with respect to bmt−5 and rB(t−5,5) as described above. In Regression 3, the coeﬃcients
and t-statistics on bmt−5 and rB(t−5,5) are identical to those in Regression 1: this must
be the case since rI(B) is orthogonalized to these two variables each year. Also given
17our orthogonalization procedure, the coeﬃcient and t-statistic on rI(B) in Regression 3 is
identical to those on r(t − 5,t) in Regression 2.
The results in Regression 3 and in Table 3 reveal no reliable relation between future
and past book returns, but a strongly signiﬁcant relation between future returns and
past intangible returns. To test the robustness of this hypothesis, we estimate similar
regressions using other types of tangible information. Speciﬁcally, to be consistent with
the earlier work of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), we examine sales, cash ﬂow,
and earnings. Our deﬁnitions of these variables follow LSV’s; earnings are measured
before extraordinary items, and cash ﬂow is deﬁned as earnings plus depreciation.
In Regressions 4, 7 and 10 we redo Regression 1 from Table 3, only using the lagged
log sales-to-price ratio, cash ﬂow-to-price ratio, and earnings-to-price ratio.24 These vari-
ables forecast future returns about as well as the book-to-market ratio. We then break
down these fundamental-to-price ratios into the components, based on the decompositions
equivalent to that in equation (2). The evidence in Regressions 6, 9 and 12 are consistent
with the book return measure: the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on the fundamental-return
variables are insigniﬁcant and small relative to the coeﬃcients and t-statistics on the past
intangible returns in the same regressions.25
Regression 13 in Table 4 regresses future returns on the past tangible and intangible
returns, where these are calculated using yearly cross-sectional multiple regressions of past
returns on all eight lagged fundamental-to-price ratios and fundamental-return measures,
that is:
ri(t−5,t) = α + β1 bmi,t−5 + β2 spi,t−5 + β3 cpi,t−5 + β4 epi,t−5
+β5r
B
i (t−5,t) + β6r
SLS
i (t−5,t) + β7r
CF
i (t−5,t) + β8r
ERN
i (t−5,t) + ²i
Speciﬁcally, in each year, the past return for each ﬁrm is broken up into three parts:
an expected return/growth component, and unanticipated tangible and intangible return
components. Our proxy for the unanticipated tangible return for ﬁrm i is:
r
T(Tot)
i (t−5,t) ≡ ˆ β5r
B
i (t−5,t) + ˆ β6r
SLS
i (t−5,t) + ˆ β7r
CF
i (t−5,t) + ˆ β8r
ERN
i (t−5,t)
24We follow convention in using the terminology “price” for these three ratios, and “market” for the
book-to-market ratio. “Market” has the same meaning as “price.”
25The one coeﬃcient that is close to being statistically signiﬁcant here is that on rS in Regression 6.
However, note that the coeﬃcient is positive rather than negative, as would expected if there is simple
overreaction to past sales growth.
18By construction, our tangible return measure is orthoganalized with respect to bmi,t−5,
spi,t−5, cpi,t−5, and epi,t−5. Assuming our speciﬁcation is reasonably accurate – meaning
that these price-scaled variables at t − 5 capture expected growth, and that this rela-
tion is relatively constant across ﬁrms – our tangible return measure should measure the
unanticipated changes in measured ﬁrm performance over the period from t − 5 to t.
Our proxy for the ﬁrm’s intangible return (r
I(Tot)
i (t−5,t)) is deﬁned as the residual of
this regression. The ﬁndings from Regression 13, which regresses future returns on the
past tangible and intangible returns that are calculated in this manner, suggests that a
ﬁrm’s tangible return is not associated with future returns, but the intangible returns are
strongly and signiﬁcantly negatively associated with future returns.
In the last column of this Table, we also report the time-series averages of the R2s
for the annual cross-sectional regressions of past returns on the lagged fundamental price
ratios and fundamental-growth measures. These R2s range from 21.3% in the sales regres-
sion, to almost 60% in the total regression. In summary, the cross-sectional regressions can
explain a substantial fraction of the cross-section of realized returns with these accounting-
growth measures. Again, the interesting thing here is not the high R2s, but the strong
link between the unexplained component of the past return (the intangible component)
and future returns, and the lack of such a relation for the tangible component.
D. A Time Horizon Robustness Check
This section examines the possibility that there is over or underreaction to tangible in-
formation over shorter horizons that we fail to pick up in the previous regressions.26 To
examine this possibility, we reestimate the regressions in Table 4, only now breaking up
the past fundamental returns into the components from t−5 to t−3, and from t−3 to t.
Since we are doing everything in logs, the sum of these two components is the return from
t − 5 to t. These regressions, reported in Table 5, show that, for each of our four basic
measures of fundamental growth, both the (t − 5,t − 3) and the (t − 3,t) components of
fundamental-growth are unrelated to future returns.27
In Regressions 3, 5, 7, and 9 in this Table, we report the results of performing the
Fama-MacBeth regressions with the tangible and intangible components of the past ﬁrm
26For example, we know that there is post-earnings announcement drift a horizons of about a year.
It is possible that there is long-horizon overreaction to fundamental growth, but this is masked by the
post-earnings announcement drift in our 5-year tests.
27The coeﬃcient on rSLS(t − 5,t − 3) actually is statistically signiﬁcant here (t = 2.15), but the
coeﬃcient is positive rather than negative, suggesting that if anything there is underreaction to lagged
sales-growth at this horizon.
19returns. The calculations of these components is identical to what was done in Section
IV.B, except that we now deﬁne the tangible return for book (rT(B∗)), for example, as the
ﬁtted component of the regression of r(t−5,5) onto bmt−5, rB(t−5,t−3) and rB(t−3,t).
Again, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that current returns are orthogonal
to past tangible returns.
E. Seasonal Eﬀects
Both the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) reversal eﬀect and the book-to-market eﬀect have
strong January seasonals. Given this, we expect the results presented in the previous
subsections to also diﬀer between January and non-January months.
Tables 6 and 7 present the regressions from Tables 3 and 4, estimated separately for
January and non-January returns. Regressions A in the two tables shows the simple
reversal eﬀect in and out of January. Consistent with other studies, we ﬁnd that the
reversal eﬀect is very strong in January – the coeﬃcient is about a factor of 25 larger
than for the non-January regression – and is statistically insigniﬁcant outside of January.
Also consistent with earlier work, Regression 1 in the ﬁrst panel of the each of two tables
shows that the bm eﬀect is stronger in January - the coeﬃcient on bmt is a factor of 10
higher – but is still signiﬁcant in the non-January months. The ﬁndings are about the
same for the other fundamental-price ratios.
One striking thing in Table 6 is that the January coeﬃcients in the univariate regres-
sions on the book, sales, cashﬂow, and earnings returns (the regressions numbered (3))
are all signiﬁcantly negative. In other words, in the month of January, there is evidence
that ﬁrms that have experienced high book returns, earnings growth, or sales growth,
tend to have low returns. This evidence is consistent with tax loss selling that depresses
the stock returns of past winners, regardless of whether their past returns were generated
because of favorable tangible or intangible information. However, oﬀsetting this is the
fact that outside of January, the equivalent coeﬃcients are all positive, and signiﬁcant at
a 5% level for the sales-return and cash-ﬂow return measures. The February-December
regression results are shown in Table 7. As a result there is no signiﬁcant evidence of over-
or underreaction to accounting growth across the year. In addition, it should be noted
that the sign on the accounting growth variables are all positive in the multiple regres-
sions, which is consistent with the hypothesis that January reversals due to fundamental
returns occur only because of the correlation between fundamental and stock returns, and
that in January as well as other months, intangible returns reverse more strongly than
20tangible returns.
F. Other Robustness Checks
In this subsection we summarize the results of a variety of additional tests which we used
to examine the robustness of our conclusions. An appendix detailing the results of these
robustness tests is available on request from the authors.
F.1 Firm Size
We ﬁrst examined whether our results are consistent across ﬁrm size. Here we classify a
ﬁrm as “large” if its market capitalization is greater that that of the median NYSE ﬁrm.28
We ran our Fama and MacBeth (1973) tests for subsamples of large and small ﬁrms.
The results are fully consistent with our full sample results: for both subsamples, both
past intangible returns and composite share issuance forecast future the cross-section of
future returns, but past tangible returns do not.
We also ran the time-series tests of the value-weighted orthogonalized portfolios of
Section VI.B for subsamples of large and small capitalization stocks. Consistent with
our full sample results, the composite-share-issuance based portfolio returns cannot be
explained by either the CAPM or the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model. The
intangible return portfolio returns are inconsistent with the CAPM for either large or
small ﬁrms, but not inconsistent the 3-factor model.
Finally, we examined whether there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the relation between
any of these variables and future returns across ﬁrm size. Our tests ﬁnd no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the Fama and MacBeth (1973) coeﬃcients on past tangible
returns, intangible returns, or on composite-issuance across small and large ﬁrms. These
results all hold whether we calculate tangible returns with respect to book-, earnings-,
sales-, or cashﬂow-returns.
F.2 Time Subperiod Analysis
We also examined whether the results hold in two non-overlapping subsamples of time.
The ﬁrst subperiod examined was 1968:07-1985:06 (204 Months), and the second was
1985:07-2001:12 (198 Months).
28We perform this classiﬁcation as of the end of June of each year, and the classiﬁcation is maintained
through the end of June of the subsequent year.
21With one exception the Fama-MacBeth tests for the subperiods are fully consistent
with the full-sample results: past tangible returns don’t forecast future returns at a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant level, and past intangible returns and past composite-issuance both
do forecast future returns. This is true whether we calculate tangible and intangible re-
turns using sales, cash ﬂow, or earnings,or book, with the one exception that the relation
between past intangible returns and future returns is insigniﬁcant when we use book.
F.3 Asymmetry Tests
We also investigate whether there is any asymmetry in the intangible-return or composite
share issuance eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether past positive and negative intan-
gible (and tangible) returns forecast future returns diﬀerently. If the predictability we
observe arises because of mispricing, and short sale restrictions make it costly for arbi-
trageurs to eliminate overpricing, such asymmetries might result. However, we found no
evidence of any statistically signiﬁcant asymmetries for intangible returns. Interestingly,
when tangible returns are calculated using cash ﬂow measures, there is marginally signif-
icant evidence of a diﬀerence for tangible returns, but the relation is slightly stronger for
negative past tangible returns, which goes against the short-sale constraints hypothesis.
V. Share Issuance and Future Returns
In this Section we examine the relation between the composite share issuance measure
introduced in Section III and future returns. As we mentioned in the introduction, we
have two rationales for this. First, in Subsection V.A we use this measure to reconcile
our ﬁndings with the LSV ﬁndings that suggest that stock prices overreact to past sales
growth. In addition, as we discuss in Subsection V.A below, the share-issuance variable
provides an additional measure of intangible information.
To understand this, recall that past evidence (e.g., Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman
(2001)) indicates that ﬁrms are more likely to issue equity and less likely to repurchase
shares following periods when their stock prices perform well relative to their earnings.
Table 8 shows that this is also the case in our sample.29 Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms
tend to issue (repurchase) shares following favorable (unfavorable) intangible information;
that is when past returns have been high relative to past book returns.
29The dependent variable in these regressions is somewhat diﬀerent than what was examined in the
prior literature. The prior literature examines issuance, repurchases and dividends separately. In contrast,
we are examining a single variable that captures the eﬀect of all three sources of changes in equity capital.
22Of course, the tangible information that managers observe is much more precise than
the accounting information we use in this study, so they also have better information on
intangible information. As a result, the issuance/repurchase choices provide independent
information about intangible information; hence, if investors underreact to intangible
information, or alternatively, if intangible information is related to risk, these choices
should forecast future returns. However, their issuance choices will not be a perfect proxy
for the intangible information – other factors will also inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s issuance decision
(whether they issue or repurchase, and how much). This suggests that both our intangible
return proxies and the composite issuance chosen by the manager should forecast future
returns.
To test this possibility, in Table 9 we add ι(t − 5,t) to our earlier regressions of
returns on accounting-returns and various measures of intangible return. These regression
estimates show that ι(t − 5,t) and intangible returns are both signiﬁcant when the two
variables are included in the same regression, suggesting that these variables indeed have
independent eﬀects on returns.
As with our other evidence, the are several possible interpretations of this negative
issuance-return relation. One is that managers understand that the market overreacts to
intangible information (and underreacts to the decision to issue). Hence managers issue
opportunistically, timing their issues and repurchases to take advantage of mispricing.
Alternatively, managers may simply issue when growth options/investment opportunities
look favorable; that is following a period of high intangible returns. If investors either
overreact to the intangible information conveyed by the issuance choice, or alternatively,
the issuance choice is related to the ﬁrm’s risk, then future returns will be related to the
issuance choice in much the same way that returns are related to our accounting-based
measures of intangible information.
A. The Relation of our Results to the Findings of LSV
As discussed earlier, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, LSV) provide empirical
results which they argue support the hypothesis that investors overreact to tangible in-
formation. Speciﬁcally, LSV ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant negative relation between a
ﬁrm’s past sales growth and its future stock returns. This result, which contrasts with
the ﬁndings reported in Table 4, is puzzling since our sales return measure is similar to
the sales growth measure used by LSV. In this section we reexamine the LSV ﬁndings
and explain why our conclusions are so diﬀerent.
23We show here that the diﬀerence arises because LSV’s tests use a ﬁrm’s total sales
growth, as opposed to our sales return measure which examines growth per dollar invested.
This distinction is important since total sales growth can result either from increasing the
scale of operations (e.g., by acquiring another ﬁrm) or from increasing the eﬃciency or
productivity of the ﬁrm’s existing assets.
Mathematically, this is straightforward. Equation (9) showed that:
gSLS(t − τ,t) = rSLS(t − τ,t) + ι(t − τ,t).
That is, high total log sales growth gSLS can either result from high past sales return (a
high rSLS), or from scale increases associated with high past share issuance. This means
that the negative relation between gSLS and future returns that LSV uncover could be
caused by a negative relation between rSLS and future stock returns, but could also be
an artifact of a negative relation between past issuance activity and future stock returns,
which is consistent with the previous literature (see Section II) and with our results (see
Regressions 5 and 8 in Table 3).
This subsection shows that the strong negative relation between gSLS and future re-
turns is indeed attributable to the negative relation between equity issuance and future
returns. Speciﬁcally, we show that after controlling for equity issuance there is no relation
between total sales growth and future returns.
Only a small fraction of ﬁrms have high issuance activity (ι), and as we show it
is these high ι ﬁrms that are largely responsible for the observed sales growth-return
relation. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that after excluding the 10% of the ﬁrms with the greatest
composite share issuance, but not necessarily with the highest total sales growth, there is
no longer any relationship between total sales growth and future returns. Thus, the LSV
results appear to be attributable not to overreaction to any sort of fundamental growth,
but rather to underreaction to information about management choices that aﬀects inﬂows
and outﬂows of equity capital. Because management’s decision to issue does not generally
reﬂect favorable tangible information — indeed, Table 8 shows that ﬁrms are more likely
to issue following poor fundamental performance — managers are presumably issuing
following good intangible returns, consistent with our results in Table 8.
Regressions 2 and 3 of Table 10 report the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions that
verify that the LSV results continue to hold using our methodology and sample. In
Regression 2, the coeﬃcient on gSLS, the total sales growth, is signiﬁcantly negative.
Regression 3 reveals, consistent with LSV’s ﬁndings, that in a multiple regression the
24coeﬃcients on the cash ﬂow to price ratio (cp) and gSLS are both signiﬁcant, and the
coeﬃcient of gSLS remains about the same as in the corresponding univariate regression.
This is not surprising given that the average cross-sectional correlation between cp and
gSLS is close to zero (−0.079, t = −1.18). Thus cp and gSLS have separate explanatory
power for future returns.
However, Regression 4 shows that if instead of using gSLS as an independent variable
in the regression, we use our sales return measure rSLS we get a coeﬃcient that is quite
diﬀerent and is statistically insigniﬁcant. This diﬀerence is striking and somewhat sur-
prising since the average cross-sectional correlation between gSLS and rSLS is quite high
(ρ = 0.764,t = 11.1). Again, the diﬀerence is due to the fact that gSLS is deﬁned as the
log change in the total sales of the ﬁrm, while rSLS(t − τ,t) is adjusted for new issues,
repurchases, etc.. The diﬀerence between the two measures is composite share issuance
ι(t − τ,t), as deﬁned in equation (9).
As discussed in Section III, ι will be positive if a ﬁrm has issued equity and negative if
a ﬁrm has repurchased shares or pays dividends.30 Consistent with this, Regressions 6-8
in Table 10 illustrate that there is a strong negative relation between ι(t−5,t) and future
returns, and that, after controlling for ι, growth in sales has no signiﬁcant explanatory
power for future returns.
Note that this evidence does not support the theory that investors overreact to all
sales growth, whether caused by scale increases or not. If this were the case, then we
would ﬁnd that these two components of sales growth would both forecast future returns.
Instead, we ﬁnd that once we control for share issuance there is no relation between past
sales growth and future returns.
As a robustness check, we eliminate the 10% of ﬁrms with the highest ι measure (i.e.,
with the highest amount of share issuance) from our sample and re-estimate Regressions
1, 2 and 3 of Panel A with this truncated sample. These are presented as Regressions 12,
13 and 14 in Panel B of Table 10. Regression 12 shows that this truncation has very little
eﬀect on the ability of the cp measure to forecast future returns. However, Regressions 13
and 14 reveal that, among the remaining 90% of the ﬁrms without strong issuance, there
is no remaining statistically signiﬁcant relation between gSLS and future returns, even if
we control for the cash ﬂow-to-price ratio.
Interestingly, regression 15 shows that eliminating the extreme ι ﬁrms weakens but
doesn’t eliminate the relation between ι and future returns – there is still enough variation
30ι will also be aﬀected by employee stock option plans, and any other actions which trade ownership
for cash or for services (in the case of stock option plans).
25in ι in this truncated sample so that ι is still a statistically reliable predictor of future
returns. Regressions 16 and 17 show that controlling for ι further weakens the relation
between gSLS and future returns in the truncated sample, but the change is not statistically
signiﬁcant.31
VI. Risk and Intangible Returns
Cross-sectional predictability can result either from risk diﬀerences between securities, or
from changes in mispricing. In this section we investigate the possibility that these return
patterns arise because tangible and intangible information realizations are associated with
diﬀerent levels of risk. We do this by ﬁrst examining how past tangible and intangible
information realizations correlate with changes in systematic and total risk. We then
examine the risk-return relation of portfolio strategies based on intangible returns.
A. Changes in Risk Measures and Intangible Returns
Up to this point we have shown that a zero-investment portfolio which buys low past
intangible stocks and shorts high past intangible return stocks earns high future returns.
As we mentioned earlier, this ﬁnding is consistent with rational expectations only if high
past intangible return stocks realize high returns in bad states of the world and low returns
in good states. That is, if the covariance risk of stocks is inversely related to the arrival
of intangible information.
There are several theoretical reasons why a stock’s risk should be correlated with its
past tangible and intangible returns. For example, Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) propose
a model in which risk changes are consistent with the empirically observed value premium.
In their model, the beta of a ﬁrm endowed with a growth opportunity decreases when
favorable information is revealed. Intuitively, the growth option moves further in the
money, so its elasticity with respect to the payoﬀ value declines.
However, other eﬀects can reverse this relationship. For example, both the number of
31One could argue that even our sales return measure doesn’t fully control for scale changes via security
issuance: speciﬁcally, if a ﬁrm doubles the scale of its operations via a debt issue, it could double both
total sales and sales return. Thus, to the extent that future returns are related to past debt-issuance,
this could induce an apparent relationship between past sales-return and future returns when none truly
exists. To examine this possibility, we ran the above regressions but included a control for log-total-asset
growth over the ﬁve years prior to portfolio formation. Sales-return remains signiﬁcant in this regression,
but interestingly the total-asset growth coeﬃcient is also negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that higher
debt as well as equity issuance over the preceding ﬁve years forecasts lower future stock returns.
26growth opportunities and their values, relative to the value of assets in place, are likely
to increase with favorable information about asset values. Since growth opportunities
are essentially options, they have higher betas than assets in place, which suggests that
favorable information about the value and number of a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities relative
to its assets in place will result in an increase in its beta. The increased tilt toward growth
opportunities is likely to be especially important when ﬁrms experience high intangible
returns.
Thus, depending on which eﬀect dominates, covariance risk can either increase or de-
crease following positive intangible returns. To examine this issue empirically, we estimate
a set of Fama-McBeth regressions that allow us to measure how tangible and intangible
information aﬀect risk. We do this by examining two proxies for risk: the ﬁrms’ market
betas and their total variance.
We ﬁrst examine the market beta. Table 11 presents the results of a set of Fama-
MacBeth regressions in which the dependent variable is the ﬁrms’ beta with respect to
the CRSP value weighted index in the two years following portfolio formation. The inde-
pendent variables are the fundamental-to-price ratios, fundamental returns, and tangible
and intangible returns we have previously used to forecast returns. Because we are inter-
ested in how risk changes with new tangible and intangible information, we also include
as a control ˆ βt−5, which is the lagged beta measured over the 24 months from t − 6 to
t − 4.
These regressions reveal that, for all accounting growth measures except sales, and for
the total tangible and intangible returns, the relation between the past intangible return
and beta is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but the coeﬃcients are positive rather than
negative. This evidence, which is consistent with intangible returns being associated with
the addition of new growth opportunities, is inconsistent with the theory that the higher
returns associated with stocks with low intangible returns is compensation for systematic
risk.
CAPM beta is of course an imperfect measure of risk. Thus, in Table 12 we examine
whether the coeﬃcient relating past tangible and intangible returns to total ﬁrm return
standard deviation are consistent with a risk-based story. This table presents the results
of Fama-MacBeth regressions of the ﬁrms’ monthly return standard deviation in the two
years following portfolio formation on the lagged standard deviation and on our measures
of past tangible and intangible returns. These regressions show that, in almost all cases,
the coeﬃcient relating the change in the ﬁrms’ return standard deviation to the past
27intangible return is positive; the exception is once again the sales-based calculation.
These results should be interpreted cautiously: the beta and standard-deviation series
in the regressions are highly autocorrelated and while we use Newey-West standard errors
to determine the t-statistics, these standard errors are correct asymptotically but may
not be valid for the short time we examine series here. However, our results for past
intangible returns in the next subsection conﬁrm the general ﬁndings of this section.
B. The Risk-Adjusted Returns of the Fama-MacBeth Portfolio Strategies
In previous sections we have shown Fama-MacBeth regressions that suggest that the
returns to trading on past intangible return issuance might be large. In this section we
investigate whether such returns are likely to be achievable, and whether the CAPM or
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model can explain the mean returns of these
portfolio strategies.
One way to interpret the time-series of coeﬃcients in a set of Fama and MacBeth
regressions is as a set of returns to zero-investment portfolios with weights at each time







where the matrix Xt is the set of independent variables from the cross-sectional regression
at time t.
Portfolios with these weights can be constructed, and if one were able to trade at
the prices reported by CRSP, the average returns of these portfolios would equal the
coeﬃcients reported in the preceding tables. However, these portfolios are eﬀectively
equal-weighted and thus require monthly rebalancing. This means that bid-ask bounce,
illiquidity, and transaction costs might make the actual returns from such a strategy
unachievable, especially for low market-capitalization portfolios.
In this section we consider value-weighted versions of these coeﬃcient portfolios. The
























¢+ is a vector whose elements
equal wEW
t when this is positive, and otherwise are zero, and MEt is the vector of ﬁrm




t denote the sum of the market-caps of the
28ﬁrms whose elements in wEW
t are positive and negative, respectively.
Constructing the weights in this way yields some nice properties. First, notice that
the sum over the positive weights is +1, and the sum over the negative weights is −1, so
the zero investment portfolio returns we report will be as conventionally deﬁned (i.e., as
the proﬁt from going long $1 and short $1.). Second since our vector of RHS variables
Xt only changes once per year on July 1, the returns we report will be buy-and-hold
portfolio returns which are rebalanced once per year, each July 1. Finally, while this
weighting scheme does not produce exact value-weighting, it does ensure that small market
cap stocks should generally have portfolios weights roughly proportional to their market
capitalizations. These last two properties, along with the fact that we exclude all stocks
with a end-of-June price less than $5, should mean that frictions in trading these stocks
are minimized.
Table 13 presents the results of time series regressions for three zero investment port-
folios with weights corresponding to three FM regression coeﬃcients. The portfolio evalu-
ated in Panel A has weights corresponding to the coeﬃcient on rI(B) in Table 4, regression
3; Panel B uses the ι(t−5,t) coeﬃcient in univariate cross-sectional regressions as in Table
9, regression A; and Panel C uses the weights corresponding to the ι(t − 5,t) coeﬃcient
in the multivariate cross-sectional regressions with bmt−5, rB(t−5,t), rI(B) as additional
RHS variables (as in Table 9, regression 3). That is, these weights are orthogonalized to
past tangible and intangible returns.
In rows 1, 4 and 7 of Table 13 we report the mean returns and associated t-statistics
for each of the three portfolios. In rows 2, 5 and 8 we report the results of a time series
regression:
rp,t = α + βMkt(Rm,t − Rf,t) + ²t
Consistent with the results reported in the previous subsection, the coeﬃcient on the
excess market return is 0.177 (t=4.73): the high-intangible return ﬁrms (which experience
low future returns) actually have a higher beta than the low-intangible return ﬁrms.
Here, the risk story goes the wrong way. In this test, we also obtain an alpha of −0.44
(t=−2.53), so we reject the CAPM-null hypothesis that α = 0.
To assess whether the return of this zero investment portfolio is consistent with the
Fama and French 3-factor model one can run a time-series regression with the three FF
factors as independent variables:
rp,t = α + βMkt · (Rm,t − Rf,t) + βSMB · SMBt + βHML · HMLt + ²t.
29For the intangible-return based zero investment portfolio, we get a strongly signiﬁcant
negative coeﬃcient of about −1 on HML (t = −32.18), a negative and signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcient on SMB (t = −2.53). Thus, we ﬁnd that we can reject the CAPM, but cannot
reject the FF 3-factor model.
Panels B and C report the results of equivalent regressions for our value-weighted
coeﬃcient portfolio corresponding to the issuance variable. Here we ﬁnd that the in-
tercepts are all negative. Furthermore, we can reject the hypothesis that the SMB and
HML factors explain the average returns of these portfolios at a high level of statistical
signiﬁcance.
VII. Conclusions
The information responsible for stock price movements can be decomposed into two com-
ponents. First, a ﬁrm’s share price moves in response to new information about its current
or past fundamental performance, i.e. to accounting information. Since this information
is relatively concrete, we have referred to it as tangible information, and the associated
return as the tangible return. The second component of the stock’s return, which is by
deﬁnition orthogonal to the ﬁrst, is referred to as the intangible return. The intangible
return presumably reﬂects intangible information about the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows, or
about its risk.
We ﬁnd that this decomposition is quite useful for helping us think about empirical
regularities that have previously been discussed in the literature. For example, previous
explanations of the reversal eﬀect and the book-to-market eﬀect have focused on the
idea that stock returns are negatively related to past fundamental performance. These
explanations include risk-based explanations which posit that risk premia are associated
with past realizations of fundamental performance – for example that high book-to-market
ﬁrms are “distressed” in some fundamental sense, and enjoy high risk premia for this
reason. There are also behavioral explanations which posit that investors overreact to the
poor earnings performance of high book-to-market ﬁrms.
Our empirical evidence is inconsistent with both explanations. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant cross-sectional relation between our past performance measures and future
stock returns. Rather, we ﬁnd that the book-to-market and reversal eﬀects arise because
future returns are cross-sectionally related to past realizations of intangible information,
i.e., to that component of past returns that cannot be explained by the tangible informa-
30tion about fundamental performance.
The fact that we see intangible return reversals and not tangible return reversals is
consistent with several other results in the literature. For example, Fama and French
(1996) show that the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) reversal eﬀect is subsumed by the book-
to-market eﬀect. We show that this is because only intangible returns reverse, and the
book-to-market ratio is a good proxy for past intangible returns. In addition, there is
no return reversal outside of January, while the book-to-market eﬀect is present in all
months. Consistent with this, we show that intangible return reversals occur even outside
of January.
In addition, we investigate the relation between a ﬁrm’s composite issuance and its
future stock returns. There are at least two reasons why the composite issuance mea-
sure is likely to be related to the realization of intangible information. The ﬁrst is that
managers are likely to issue equity to fund growth opportunities and the second is that
managers are more likely to issue equity subsequent to a decline in the perceived cost
of equity. In both cases, the equity issue is triggered by information that we classify as
intangible. Empirically, we ﬁnd that composite issuance is strongly negatively related to
future returns, even after controlling for past intangible returns. This evidence is consis-
tent with a negative relation between the past realization of intangible information and
future returns.
The predictive power of our composite issuance variable explains the discrepancy be-
tween our results and those of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, LSV). LSV present
evidence that investors overreact to past sales growth rates. We show that the diﬀerence
between the LSV sales growth variable and ours is that we measure growth on a per-dollar-
invested basis, while LSV measure the overall ﬁrm’s total sales growth. Mathematically,
total (log) sales growth is equal to our measure plus composite share-issuance. Thus,
ﬁrms which issue shares, undertake share-based acquisitions, or compensate their em-
ployees with stock options may have large total sales growth, but not a high sales-return.
We show that only ﬁrms which grow via share issuance experience negative future returns.
There are plausible risk-based models that are consistent with the idea that risk and
expected returns increase following negative realizations of intangible information. How-
ever, our preliminary analysis fails to support these models. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
high past intangible returns and past issuance ﬁrms have a higher CAPM beta, which is
inconsistent with the lower future returns of these ﬁrms. The Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model explains the abnormal future returns associated with our direct mea-
31sure of past intangible returns (because book-to-market is a good proxy for a ﬁrm’s past
intangible return), but fails to explain the returns associated with share issuance. It is
possible that future rational-expectations models may explain our results, but such an
explanation will have to show how stock returns covary with priced risk-factors in a way
that makes the risk (and expected returns) decline upon the realization of good intangible
information, decline when ﬁrms issue equity, and be relatively unrelated to the realization
of tangible information.
Behavioral theories may oﬀer another avenue for explaining these results. There is
substantial evidence from the psychology literature that individuals are overconﬁdent
about their abilities, and as a result, tend to overestimate the quality of information
signals they generate about security values. The psychology literature also suggests that
the degree to which individuals are overconﬁdent depends on the situation. In particular,
individuals tend to be more overconﬁdent about their ability to evaluate information that
is relatively vague, i.e., information that we have classiﬁed as intangible. As a result, there
is likely to be more evidence of overreaction to intangible information, which is consistent
with our ﬁnding that favorable intangible information about a stock is followed by lower
than average subsequent returns.
Up to this point, we have deﬁned intangible information by what it is not; it is informa-
tion that is orthogonal to the tangible information that appears on the ﬁrm’s accounting
statements. An interesting avenue of future research would be to identify sources of intan-
gible information that leads to overreaction. We have conjectured that this is information
that is related to ﬁrms’ growth opportunities. In particular, it may be the case that in-
vestors overestimate the precision of relatively nebulous information about future growth
opportunities, and as a result, tend to overreact to the information. Unfortunately, testing
this possibility is likely to be diﬃcult since, almost by deﬁnition, it is diﬃcult to identify
and characterize this nebulous information.
Alternatively, it is possible that our results arise because of price changes that are
essentially self-generated. For example, it is plausible that small movements in stock
prices, generated by relatively minor liquidity events, can snowball into major price moves
if the original price move attracts the interest of momentum investors and analysts who
develop “stories” to explain the price move (see, e.g., DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and
Waldmann (1990)).32 Such a scenario can be viewed as overreaction, if one classiﬁes
32DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) remark that Soros’ trading strategies around the
conglomerate boom appear similar to positive feedback trading strategies of this sort:
The truly informed investment strategy in this case, says Soros, was not to sell short in
32reacting to nothing as overreacting. It is also possible that this “noise” is generated by
changes in perceptions about risk. While this is a possibility, our results suggest that
these changes in risk perceptions, if they do exist, are either irrational or are related to
elements of risk that are quite diﬀerent than traditional risk measures.
anticipation of the eventual collapse of conglomerate shares (for that would not happen
until 1970) but instead to buy in anticipation of further buying by uninformed investors.
The initial price rise in conglomerate stocks, caused in part by purchases by speculators like
Soros, stimulated the appetites of uninformed investors since it created a trend of increasing
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We use CRSP data for stock prices and returns. We use the merged COMPUSTAT annual
data (supplied by CRSP) for all accounting information, and for the number of shares. To
merge the CRSP and COMPUSTAT data, we use CRSPLink, as updated by Ken French.
To get shareholders’ equity, we use, if it is not missing, Stockholders’ equity (item
216). It it is missing, we use Total Common Equity (item 60) plus Preferred stock Par
Value (item 130) if both of these are present. Otherwise, we use Total Assets (item 6)
minus Total Liabilities (item 181), if both are present. If none of these give us a valid
shareholders’ equity measure, we treat shareholders’ equity as missing for this ﬁrm year.
To get book equity, we subtract from shareholders’ equity the preferred stock value,
where we use use redemption value (item 56), liquidating value (item 10), or carrying
value (item 130), in that order, as available. If all of the redemption, liquidating, or par
value are missing from COMPUSTAT, then we treat the book-equity value as missing for
that year. Finally, if not missing, we add in balance sheet deferred taxes (item 35) to this
book-equity value, and subtract oﬀ the FASB106 adjustment (item 330).
Our earnings measure is income before extraordinary items (item 18), and our sales
measure is the COMPUSTAT sales (item 12). These two deﬁnitions are consistent with
those of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994). Our cash-ﬂow measure is income be-
fore extraordinary items minus the share of depreciation that can be allocated to (after-
interest) income, plus any deferred taxes, that is:
CF = INC + DEPR ×
µ
ME
Assets − BE + ME
¶
+ DFTX
where INC is income before extraordinary items, DEPR is depreciation from COMPUS-
TAT (item 14), Assets is total assets (item 6), DFTX is deferred taxes (item 50), and BE
and ME are book- and market-equity, as deﬁned above.
B. Market Reactions to Diﬀerent Types of Information
This section develops a simple model that provides more explicit intuition for linking our
empirical results to speciﬁc behavioral biases. The model describes three sources of stock
price movements. These include accounting-based information about the ﬁrm’s current
proﬁtability (tangible information); other information about the ﬁrm’s future growth op-
portunities (intangible information); and pure noise. To keep it simple, there are three
dates, 0, 1 and 2, a single risk-neutral investor, and a risk-free rate of zero.
Given these assumptions, price changes and returns would not be forecastable were
all investors rational. However, in our model investors misinterpret new information and
as a result make expectational errors. The model captures three kinds of errors:
1. Over- or Underreaction to Tangible Information: Investors may not correctly in-
corporate information contained in past accounting growth rates in forming their
37estimates of the future cash ﬂows that will accrue to shareholders. In our empir-
ical tests, we investigate whether investors over- or underreact to the information
in earnings, cash ﬂow, sales, or growth rates. Given the linear speciﬁcation of our
model Over- or Underreaction to past growth rates is equivalent to over- or under-
extrapolating these growth rates.
2. Over- or Underreaction to Intangible Information: Intangible information is news
about future cash ﬂows which is not reﬂected in current accounting-based growth
numbers. Investors may over- or underreact to intangible information, perhaps
because they over- or underestimate the precision of this information.
3. Pure Noise: Overreaction means that investors move prices too much in response
to information about future cash ﬂows. Alternatively, we classify stock movements
as pure noise if they are uncorrelated with future cash ﬂows. One interpretation of
this comes from microstructure theory: if investors overestimate the extent to which
their counterparts are informed, they will overreact to purely liquidity motivated
trades. Alternatively, noise trades can represent an extreme form of overconﬁdence,
in which investors believe that they have valuable signals about future cash ﬂows,
but in reality their signals are unrelated to future cash ﬂows.
An alternative interpretation of what we call over- and underreaction to information
and noise can arise in a model with rational risk averse investors who sometimes perceive
changes in risk or experience changes in risk preferences. For example, holding expected
cash ﬂows constant, if an industrial sector becomes riskier, stock prices will initially decline
(because of the increased required rate of return) and will then be expected to increase
because of the increased risk premium. Moreover, changes in risk or risk preferences may
also change in response to either tangible or intangible information in ways that generate
return patterns that are indistinguishable from over or underreaction to these sources of
information, as discussed in Section VI.A.
B.1. The Model
The following provides the timing of the various information and cash ﬂow realizations
along with a brief description of the structure of the model. A summary of the model
variables are given in Table 1.
Book Values and Cash Flows:
1. At date 0, the ﬁrm is endowed with assets with value B0, which we denote as the
initial book value of the ﬁrm’s assets. We assume that the assets do not physically
depreciate over time. At times 1 and 2, the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows are ˜ θ1 and ˜ θ2. Each
period, the book value grows by the amount of the cash ﬂow.
2. At date 2 the ﬁrm is liquidated and all proceeds are paid to shareholders. Investors
are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate is zero, so the price equals the expected book
value at time 2.
38Table 1: A Summary of the Model Variables
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Cash Flows (θt): − ˜ θ1 = ¯ θ + ˜ ²1 ˜ θ2 = ¯ θ + ρ˜ ²1 + ˜ ²2
Intangible Signal: − ˜ s (=˜ ²2−˜ u) −
Price “Noise”: − ˜ e −
Bt B0 B0+˜ θ1 (=B0+¯ θ+˜ ²1) B1 + ˜ θ2
ER
t [ ˜ B2]) B0+2¯ θ B1+ρ˜ ²1+˜ s+˜ e B2
Mt (=EC
t [ ˜ B2]) B0+2¯ θ B1+ρE˜ ²1+(1+ω)˜ s+˜ e B2
(B−M)t −2¯ θ −




t−1,t − ˜ θ1 (=¯ θ+˜ ²1) ˜ θ2 (=¯ θ+ρ˜ ²1+˜ ²2)
rt−1,t − (1+ρE)˜ ²1 + (1+ω)˜ s + ˜ e −
£




• ˜ ²2 = ˜ s + ˜ u, where ˜ u ⊥ {˜ s,˜ ²1}




• ˜ ²1 ∼ N(0,σ2
1), ˜ ²2 ∼ N(0,σ2
2), ˜ s ∼ N(0,σ2
s), ˜ e ∼ N(0,σ2
e)
Expectations of Future Cash Flows:
1. At t = 0 the expected cash ﬂows at dates 1 and 2 are E0[˜ θ1] = E0[˜ θ2] = ¯ θ respec-
tively.33
2. The unexpected cash ﬂow at time 1 is ˜ ²1, so the total realized time 1 cash ﬂow is
˜ θ1 = ¯ θ1 + ˜ ²1.
3. At t = 1, the conditional expected value of the time 2 cash ﬂow reﬂects both
accounting and non-accounting information. We assume a linear relation between
the time 1 and time 2 accounting growth. Speciﬁcally ER[˜ θ2|˜ θ1] = ¯ θ2 + ρ˜ ²1, where
ρ is a measure of the accounting growth persistence.34 The R superscript denotes
Rational. Since investors are not necessarily rational in this setting, their perceived
expectations may not be rational.
4. The investor also observes non-accounting based information. We summarize this
information as the signal ˜ s = ER[˜ θ2|Ω1]−ER[˜ θ2|˜ θ1], where Ω1 denotes the set of all
information available to the investor at time 1. ˜ s would represent the total eﬀect of
non-accounting based information on the price, were investors rational. Note that
by deﬁnition s is orthogonal to accounting-based information – it can be thought of
as summarizing the residual from the projection of Ω1 onto θ1.
Market Price Reactions to Information: Since investors are risk neutral and fully
rational, conditional expected price changes equal zero, and the price at time 1 (P1) is
33This assumption makes (B−M)0 a perfect proxy for E0[rB
0,1]. If this were not the case, the model
results would be qualitatively the same, but algebraically more complicated.
34In our empirical tests, the implicit speciﬁcation will be diﬀerent: there we assume a linear relation
between the log-book return and future returns.
39equal to ER[B2|Ω1]. However, as discussed earlier, in this model there are three possible
biases in the way investors set prices:
1. We model over and underreaction to tangible information by allowing investors to
believe that the persistence in cash ﬂow growth is greater than it really is (i.e., they
think it is ρE when it is really ρ < ρE). Investors then set prices according to this
belief.
2. We model investor over and underreaction to intangible information by allowing the
price response to the time 1 intangible information to be (1+ω)˜ s rather than s. ω is
thus the fractional overreaction to intangible information; if investors are rational,
ω = 0. Consistent with DHS, ω > 0 could result from the investor overconﬁdence
about their ability to interpret vague information, and ω < 0 (underreaction to
intangible information) could result from underconﬁdence.
3. In the model the time 1 price deviates from the expected payoﬀ by ˜ e ∼ N(0,σ2
e),
where ˜ e is pure noise (i.e., is orthogonal to θ2, ˜ ²1 and ˜ s). One can interpret this
“noise” term as an extreme form of overreaction where investors can receive a sig-
nal with zero precision, and act as though the signal is informative. However, as
mentioned earlier, other interpretations are possible.35
As a result of these three biases, the time 1 price is not the expected payoﬀ (P1 6=
ER
t [ ˜ B2]), so price changes (returns) are predictable using both past returns and tangible
information. In the next subsection we consider the return patterns these three biases
will generate, and ask how we can empirically separate these eﬀects.
B.2. Regression Estimates
This subsection motivates the regressions we use to evaluate the importance of extrap-
olation bias, overreaction, and noise on stock returns. We consider both univariate and
multivariate regressions of future price changes on past price changes, book value changes
and book-to-market ratios. We carry out the related regressions in Section IV. The
derivations of the mathematical results in this Section are given in Appendix C.
Return Reversal:
Consider ﬁrst a univariate regression of future price changes r1,2 (≡P2−P1) on past
price changes r0,1. This is equivalent to the long-horizon regression used by DeBondt and
Thaler (1985). Based on our model assumptions, this coeﬃcient is:
β = −
µ
(ρE − ρ)(1 + ρE)σ2









If investors are fully rational (ρE = ρ, ω = 0, and σ2
e = 0), β will be zero. However, a
negative coeﬃcient will result when investors over-extrapolate earnings (ρE > ρ), overre-
act to intangible information (ω > 0), incorporate noise into the price (σ2
e > 0), or any
combination of these three.
35For example, prices can fall if investors receive liquidity shocks that force them to sell.
40Isolating the Extrapolation Eﬀect:
The extrapolation eﬀect can be directly estimated with the following univariate re-
gression of r1,2 on the lagged book return (rB
0,1≡B1 − B0).
r1,2 = α + βB r
B
0,1 + ² (11)










This will be negative if ρE > ρ (when the investor over-extrapolates past earnings growth)
and will be zero if investors properly assess tangible information (if ρE = ρ). Neither
overreaction to growth (ω) nor noise (σ2
e) aﬀects βB, so βB isolates the extrapolation
eﬀect.
Intuitively, this regression works because rB is a proxy for the time 1 unexpected cash
ﬂow. However rB is a noisy proxy because it is the sum of the expected and unexpected
cash ﬂows. We can better isolate the unexpected cash ﬂows by controlling for the expected
component of rB. We can do this by including the lagged book-to-market ratio on the
RHS of this regression:
r1,2 = α + βBr
B
0,1 + βBM(B−M)0 + ²
By controlling for the lagged book-to-market ratio, we control for the component of the
book return that is expected and increase the absolute value of the coeﬃcient of rB. The
coeﬃcients from this multivariate regression are:
βB = −(ρ
E − ρ)
βBM = βB/2 (13)
Thus, the regression on past book return isolates the extrapolation eﬀect. We can isolate
the overreaction and noise eﬀects by using a multivariate regression of r1,2 on past return,
past book return and the lagged book-to-market ratio:
r1,2 = α + βBM(B − M)0 + βBr
B
0,1 + βRr0,1 + ˜ ² (14)




e + ω(1 + ω)σ2
s
σ2




βB = −βR(1 + ρ
E) − (ρ
E − ρ) (16)
βBM = βB/2 (17)
The “intangible reversal” coeﬃcient in this regression, βR, is indicative of the eﬀect
of past returns on future returns, after controlling for the tangible information in the
book return (rB
0,1). From equation (15), this will be negative when there is either noise
41or overreaction to intangible information. However, because of the presence of the con-
trols, the magnitude of this coeﬃcient is unaﬀected by under or overreaction to tangible
information. Equation (15) shows that:
1. If σ2
e À σ2
s, βR → −1.
This coeﬃcient captures the intangible return reversal. If all of the return between
t = 0 and t = 1 that is not related to the book returns is due to pure noise, then
this return must completely reverse on average.
2. If σ2
e > 0, but ω = 0, the βR → −σ2
e/(σ2
e + σ2
s) implying that −1 < βR < 0.
The past return will contain information about future growth, but will also contain
noise. This will mean that there will be incomplete reversal.
3. If σ2
e = 0, but ω>0, then βR = −ω/(1 + ω), again implying that −1 < βR < 0.
The intuition for this coeﬃcient is straightforward: the time 1 price change is (1 +
ω)˜ s, of which −ωs is reversed at time 2. This means that a fraction ω/(1+ω) of this
component of the price move is eventually reversed. Again with these parameters,
there is incomplete reversal.
Interestingly, results 2 and 3 indicate that it is impossible to distinguish between the
case of pure noise (σ2
e > 0, ω = 0) and overreaction (ω > 0, σ2
e = 0). This makes intuitive
sense: the econometrician cannot directly observe sg, but can only infer it through price
movements. What this means is that, based on the analysis here, we will be unable to
discriminate between overreaction and pure noise.36 As we will discuss later, it is only
possible to discriminate between these two alternatives by ﬁnding better proxies for the
information about future cash ﬂows, and analyzing whether the changes in mispricing are
related to the arrival of this information.
It is important to note that, unlike in the univariate regression (11), the coeﬃcient
βB in this multivariate regression will not necessarily be zero if there is no extrapolation
bias (if ρE = ρ), because it is a control for the tangible component of the past returns.
Similarly, the lagged book-to-market ratio (B−M)0 in this regression serves as a control
for the ex-ante forecastable component of the book return (the ¯ θ1 term in rB). Since, in
the models, (B−M)0 = −2¯ θ, βBM = βB/2.
B.3. Direct Intangible Return Estimation
An alternative way to generate the results described in the last subsection is to ﬁrst isolate
the intangible return by regressing ˜ r0,1 on rB
0,1 and (B−M)0:
r0,1 = γ0 + γBM(B − M)0 + γBr
B
0,1 + ˜ v
The residual from this regression, the component of the past return that is orthogonal to
the unexpected book return, is deﬁned as the intangible return (though it captures both
36Similarly, it is impossible to distinguish between overreaction and noise by looking at the relation
between past return and book return and future book return.
42the return associated with intangibles and the noise term):
r
(B)
I (0,1) ≡ ˜ v ≡
¡




= (1 + ω)˜ s + ˜ e (18)
The (B) superscript denotes that this return is orthogonalized with respect to the unex-
pected book return. Then, a modiﬁed version of the regression in equation (14) (the only
change being the substitution of rI
0,1 for r0,1:)
r1,2 = α + β
0








I (0,1) + ˜ ²






e + ω(1 + ω)σ2
s
σ2












Notice that the coeﬃcient β0
I is identical to that in equation (15), and β0
B and β0
BM are
identical to those in equation (13). Thus, the coeﬃcients in this regression tell us directly
about the magnitude of the noise/intangible eﬀect (β0
I) and the extrapolation eﬀect (β0
B).
One ﬁnal item of note here: in this model, if there is only overreaction to intangible
information or noise, but no overreaction to tangible information, and if ρ ≈ 1, then
the two coeﬃcients γBM and γB in the regression in equation (14) will be −βR/2, −βR,
and βR, respectively. In this case, some straightforward algebra shows that the best
estimate of r1,2 is (a constant times)
³




, in other words close to the
book-to-market ratio at time 1. What this illustrates is that, depending on some of the
persistence parameters, the current book-to-market ratio may end up being a good proxy
for the intangible information, and speciﬁcally a much better proxy than the past return
itself, which incorporates the eﬀects of both tangible and intangible information.
C. Derivation of Model Equations
Derivation of Equation (10):





¿From the equations for r0,1 and r1,2 in Table 1, and given that that ²1, ˜ s, ˜ e, and ˜ u are
mutually uncorrelated, and that ²1 ∼ N(0,σ1), s ∼ N(0,σ2
s), e ∼ N(0,σ2






−(ρE − ρ)(1 + ρE)σ2




1 + (1 + ω)2σ2
s + σ2
e
43Derivation of Equation (12):
From the equations for r1,2 and rB
1,2 given in Table 1, and given the assumption that ˜ ²1



























, then using the equations for rB























From the equations for rB



















Derivation of Equations (15)-(17):
First, note that cov(B−M0,rB
0,1) = −2σ2(¯ θ), and cov(B−M0,r0,1) = cov(B−M0,r1,2) =
0. Therefore, in this regression, as in the regression discussed immediately above, B−M0
will serve as a perfect control for the component of rB
0,1 that is uncorrelated with r1,2 and
r0,1 (i.e., for ¯ θ).
This means that βBM = βB/2. It also means that the coeﬃcients βIR and βB are
identical to what they would be in the regression:
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45Table 2: Average Correlation Coeﬃcients of Book-to-Market and Past Return
Measures
This table reports the average annual cross-sectional correlation coeﬃcients (in %) for a set of variables
for the period 1968-2001. The standard errors for these correlation coeﬃcients are calculated using a
Newey-West procedure with 6 lags, using the time-series of the correlation coeﬃcients. t-statistics in
parentheses
bmt bmt−5 rB(t−5,t) r(t−5,t) ι(t−5,t)
bmt 100.0 52.7 -10.4 -47.8 18.9
(6.07) (-0.44) (-3.66) (1.47)
bmt−5 100.0 -44.0 19.1 13.8
(-7.79) (1.05) (1.22)





Table 3: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Returns on Book-to-Market
and Past Return Measures
1968:07-2001:12, All Months, t-statistics in parentheses
This table reports the results of a set of Fama-MacBeth regressions of future returns on fundamental-price
ratios, past accounting-growth measures, and past returns. bmt, bmt−5 and rB(t−5,t) are, respectively,
the log book-to-market ratios at times t and t − 5, the log book return from t − 5 to t. r(t−5,5) is the
past 5-year log return, lagged 6 months,and ι(t−5,5) is the composite log share issuance over the same
period. More details on the construction of these variables are given in Section A. All coeﬃcients are
X100.











6 1.206 0.097 -0.061
(4.64) (1.37) (-0.90)
7 1.263 0.232 0.229 -0.344
(5.19) (2.64) (2.60) (-3.45)
8 1.241 0.173 0.170 -0.300 -0.519
(5.02) (2.10) (2.00) (-3.14) (-4.07)
46Table 4: Fama-MacBeth Regressions with Intangible Returns
1968:07-2001:12, t-statistics in parentheses
This table reports the results of a set of Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on past returns, accounting-
growth measures and intangible returns. Calculation of the intangible returns are described in the text.
rI(B) denotes the log intangible return (relative to the book return) from t−5 to t; bmt−5 and rB(t−5,t)
are, respectively, the log book-to-market ratio at time t−5, and the log book return from t−5 to t. The
variables used in sales, cash-ﬂow, and earnings regressions are deﬁned similarly. The ﬁnal regression uses
the total tangible return, as described in the text. The average R2s reported are for the cross-sectional
regressions of past returns on past accounting-growth measures. All coeﬃcients are X100.
Const bmt bmt−5 rB(t−5,t) rI(B) r(t−5,t) R2
avg
1 1.206 0.097 -0.062
(4.64) (1.37) (-0.92)
2 1.264 0.232 0.228 -0.344
(5.19) (2.64) (2.58) (-3.45)
3 1.206 0.097 -0.062 -0.344 36.63%
(4.64) (1.37) (-0.92) (-3.45)




5 1.072 0.145 0.289 -0.333
(4.32) (2.66) (4.66) (-3.85)
6 1.041 0.084 0.105 -0.333 21.32%
(3.93) (1.67) (1.92) (-3.85)




8 1.923 0.289 0.242 -0.479
(7.73) (3.41) (3.95) (-4.36)
9 1.348 0.073 -0.049 -0.479 47.03%
(5.42) (1.05) (-1.11) (-4.36)




11 1.928 0.251 0.233 -0.454
(7.53) (3.00) (4.14) (-4.10)
12 1.323 0.064 -0.003 -0.454 45.58%
(5.37) (0.97) (-0.09) (-4.10)
Const rT(Tot)(t−5,t) rI(Tot) R2
avg
13 1.278 -0.102 -0.459 58.46%
(5.21) (-1.43) (-3.96)
47Table 5: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Returns on Lagged Growth Measures
1968:07-2001:12, t-statistics in parentheses
The results presented in this Table are almost identical to those in shown in Table 4, except that here
we break down the past-5-year book return, sales-return, cash-ﬂow-return, and earnings-return into t−5
to t − 3 and t − 3 to t values. rT(B
∗) and rI(B
∗) denote, respectively, the tangible and intangible return
calculated relative to lagged book-to-price ratio and the two book return measures. All coeﬃcients are
X100, and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are in parentheses.
The average R2s reported are for the cross-sectional regressions of past returns on past accounting-growth
measures.
Const bmt−5 rB(t−5,t−3) rB(t−3,t) r(t−5,t) rI(B∗) rT(B∗) R2
avg
1 1.269 0.224 0.225 0.223 -0.344
(5.21) (2.53) (2.40) (2.01) (-3.38)
2 1.218 0.097 0.018 -0.133 -0.344
(4.69) (1.35) (0.22) (-1.58) (-3.38)
3 1.205 -0.344 -0.073 38.79%
(4.55) (-3.38) (-0.91)
Const spt−5 rS(t−5,t−3) rS(t−3,t) r(t−5,t) rI(S∗) rT(S∗) R2
avg
4 1.082 0.142 0.272 0.304 -0.337
(4.39) (2.63) (3.87) (3.83) (-3.87)
5 1.050 0.082 0.154 0.070 -0.337
(3.99) (1.65) (2.22) (0.99) (-3.87)
6 0.993 -0.337 0.219 22.42%
(3.72) (-3.87) (1.87)
Const cpt−5 rC(t−5,t−3) rC(t−3,t) r(t−5,t) rI(C∗) rT(C∗) R2
avg
7 1.927 0.299 0.303 0.239 -0.478
(7.56) (3.29) (4.04) (3.97) (-4.22)
8 1.342 0.068 -0.036 -0.042 -0.478
(5.39) (0.95) (-0.65) (-0.88) (-4.22)
9 1.200 -0.478 -0.023 48.36%
(4.77) (-4.22) (-0.33)
Const ept−5 rE(t−5,t−3) rE(t−3,t) r(t−5,t) rI(E∗) rT(E∗) R2
avg
10 1.936 0.263 0.297 0.209 -0.452
(7.20) (2.85) (4.16) (3.82) (-3.90)
11 1.313 0.057 0.007 -0.015 -0.452
(5.25) (0.83) (0.16) (-0.36) (-3.90)
12 1.189 -0.452 0.008 47.58%
(4.74) (-3.90) (0.12)
48Table 6: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Returns on Fundamental-Price Ratios,
Lagged Returns and Lagged Growth Measures
1968:07-2001:12, January Only,
Coeﬃcients ×100, t-statistics in parentheses





2 4.410 0.833 0.943 -2.259
(4.56) (2.03) (2.24) (-4.09)
3 4.717 -0.149 -1.043 -2.259
(3.99) (-0.46) (-3.79) (-4.09)
Const spt spt−5 rS(t − 5,t) rI(S) r(t − 5,t)
1 3.410 1.155
(3.18) (3.75)
2 4.156 0.671 0.661 -2.156
(4.25) (2.74) (1.98) (-4.51)
3 4.647 0.320 -0.587 -2.156
(3.87) (1.47) (-2.38) (-4.51)
Const cpt cpt−5 rC(t−5,t) rI(C) r(t−5,t)
1 5.162 0.752
(3.35) (1.96)
2 4.533 0.213 0.181 -1.950
(4.04) (0.62) (0.69) (-3.34)
3 2.620 -0.808 -1.125 -1.950
(2.57) (-2.49) (-4.38) (-3.34)
Const ept ept−5 rE(t−5,t) rI(E) r(t−5,t)
1 5.117 0.641
(3.35) (1.86)
2 4.507 0.219 0.275 -1.934
(3.92) (0.73) (1.21) (-3.34)
3 2.326 -0.717 -0.822 -1.934




49Table 7: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Returns on Fundamental-Price Ratios,
Lagged Returns and Lagged Growth Measures
1968:07-2001:12, February-December Only,
Coeﬃcients ×100, t-statistics in parentheses





2 0.939 0.165 0.139 -0.142
(3.63) (2.02) (1.58) (-1.54)
3 0.860 0.110 0.020 -0.142
(3.19) (1.69) (0.29) (-1.54)
Const spt spt−5 rS(t − 5,t) rI(S) r(t − 5,t)
1 0.817 0.096
(2.96) (1.93)
2 0.773 0.093 0.216 -0.147
(2.96) (1.88) (3.64) (-1.85)
3 0.708 0.056 0.132 -0.147
(2.61) (1.22) (2.40) (-1.85)
Const cpt cpt−5 rC(t−5,t) rI(C) r(t−5,t)
1 1.538 0.262
(6.21) (3.45)
2 1.655 0.296 0.220 -0.319
(6.61) (3.48) (3.47) (-2.98)
3 1.212 0.153 0.033 -0.319
(4.62) (2.30) (0.83) (-2.98)
Const ept ept−5 rE(t−5,t) rI(E) r(t−5,t)
1 1.553 0.224
(6.26) (3.10)
2 1.649 0.250 0.212 -0.298
(6.50) (2.92) (3.60) (-2.75)
3 1.199 0.131 0.061 -0.298




50Table 8: Annual Fama-MacBeth Regressions of ι(t,t + 1) on Tangible and In-
tangible Return Measures
1968-2001 Fama-MacBeth t-statistics in parentheses
This table presents the results of a set of Fama-MacBeth regressions of our composite-issuance measure
over the period 1968-2001. The dependent variable in each regression is the is the composite issuance
measure ι(t,t + 1). The independent variables are the fundamental-to-price ratios, measures of funda-
mental performance, the intangible return from t − 5 to t, and composite issuance from t − 5 to t. All
coeﬃcient are ×100.







-0.904 -1.843 -2.892 2.106
(-3.46) (-17.29) (-14.01) (8.28)
-0.281 -0.922 -1.159 2.106
(-0.80) (-7.23) (-6.76) (8.28)
-0.433 7.276
(-1.64) (18.94)
-0.261 -0.427 -0.756 1.613 6.591
(-0.81) (-3.58) (-4.45) (7.99) (21.61)
51Table 9: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Returns on Past Tangible and
Intangible Returns and Composite Issuance.




Const bmt bmt−5 rB(t−5,t) rI(B) ι(t−5,t)
1 1.243 0.243 -0.518
(4.80) (2.94) (-3.66)
2 1.200 0.052 -0.086 -0.616
(4.59) (0.80) (-1.32) (-4.34)
3 1.202 0.057 -0.083 -0.300 -0.519
(4.60) (0.87) (-1.27) (-3.14) (-4.07)
Const spt spt−5 rS(t−5,t) rI(S) ι(t−5,t)
4 1.067 0.168 -0.543
(4.10) (3.07) (-3.77)
5 1.077 0.067 0.057 -0.584
(4.17) (1.41) (1.04) (-3.97)
6 1.074 0.068 0.061 -0.300 -0.511
(4.15) (1.44) (1.13) (-3.62) (-3.80)
Const cpt cpt−5 rC(t−5,t) rI(C) ι(t−5,t)
7 1.792 0.274 -0.481
(6.60) (3.78) (-3.53)
8 1.271 0.043 -0.051 -0.579
(4.92) (0.68) (-1.19) (-4.22)
9 1.286 0.048 -0.052 -0.426 -0.457
(5.01) (0.75) (-1.20) (-4.05) (-3.78)
Const ept ept−5 rE(t−5,t) rI(E) ι(t−5,t)
10 1.790 0.231 -0.477
(6.59) (3.40) (-3.53)
11 1.233 0.032 -0.006 -0.562
(4.78) (0.54) (-0.16) (-4.10)
12 1.250 0.037 -0.007 -0.403 -0.451
(4.88) (0.62) (-0.18) (-3.81) (-3.79)
52Table 10: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Monthly Returns on Cashﬂow to Price
and Past Sales Growth Measures
1968:07-2001:12, All Months, t-statistics in parentheses
This Table we perform Fama-MacBeth regressions of future returns on the cashﬂow-to-price ratio cpt,
the log total sales growth gSLS, the log sales-return rSLS, and our share issuance measure ι. Panel A
gives the results for the full sample of ﬁrms; the regressions in Panel B are run after excluding, each year,
the 10% of the ﬁrms with the largest ι(t − τ,t). All coeﬃcients are ×100.
Panel A: Full Sample Results











6 1.791 0.274 -0.481
(6.59) (3.78) (-3.53)
7 1.256 -0.076 -0.547
(4.88) (-1.23) (-4.03)
8 1.863 0.277 -0.095 -0.403
(6.82) (3.83) (-1.54) (-3.19)
9 1.256 -0.076 -0.623
(4.88) (-1.23) (-4.15)
10 1.863 0.277 -0.095 -0.498
(6.82) (3.83) (-1.54) (-3.58)
Panel B: 10% Truncated Sample Results









16 1.234 -0.038 -0.575
(4.68) (-0.57) (-2.72)
17 1.828 0.266 -0.063 -0.343
(6.46) (3.69) (-0.95) (-1.74)
53Table 11: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Market Betas on Tangible and Intan-
gible Return Measures
Annual, 1968-1999, Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses
This table reports the results the coeﬃcients and t-statistics from of a set of Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regressions. The dependent variable in each cross-sectional regression is ˆ β(t,t+2), the estimated slope
coeﬃcient from a regression of the excess return of the individual stock’s excess return on the CRSP
value-weighted portfolio excess return from July of year t through June of year t+2. The independent
variables in these regressions are the lagged estimated market beta, ˆ βt−5, estimated using returns from
July:(t−6) through June:(t−4); bmt, the book-to-market ratio as of the end of December:(t−1); bmt−5,
the book-to-market ratio as of the end of December:(t−6); and rBV (t−5,t), rT(B)(t−5,t), rI(B)(t−5,t),
the book-return, and the tangible and intangible returns using book, calculated as described in the text.
Measures using Sales, Cashﬂow, and Earnings are calculated similarly. We perform annual cross-sectional
regressions from t = 1968 through 1999. Standard errors are calculated using a Newey-West procedure
with 11 lags.
Const ˆ βt−5 bmt bmt−5 rBV(t−5,t) rT(B)(t−5,t) rI(B)(t−5,t)
1 0.828 0.281 -0.081
(32.01) (11.92) (-2.62)
2 0.866 0.276 -0.071 -0.056
(22.03) (12.22) (-2.48) (-2.78)
3 0.907 0.266 -0.084 0.061
(22.23) (12.16) (-2.69) (1.90)
Const ˆ βt−5 spt spt−5 rSLS(t−5,t) rT(S)(t−5,t) rI(S)(t−5,t)
4 0.858 0.280 0.031
(32.37) (13.51) (1.31)
5 0.852 0.280 0.032 0.022
(17.55) (13.28) (1.28) (0.72)
6 0.824 0.263 0.092 -0.015
(26.00) (12.71) (3.20) (-0.63)
Const ˆ βt−5 cpt cpt−5 rCF(t−5,t) rT(C)(t−5,t) rI(C)(t−5,t)
7 0.593 0.298 -0.101
(28.05) (12.95) (-9.25)
8 0.680 0.290 -0.060 -0.018
(10.91) (13.52) (-2.68) (-0.81)
9 0.826 0.279 -0.042 0.102
(23.75) (11.81) (-1.40) (4.25)
Const ˆ βt−5 ept ept−5 rERN(t−5,t) rT(E)(t−5,t) rI(E)(t−5,t)
10 0.553 0.302 -0.102
(13.80) (13.10) (-3.83)
11 0.638 0.296 -0.065 -0.014
(18.04) (14.04) (-4.84) (-0.62)
12 0.819 0.281 -0.044 0.112
(24.04) (11.67) (-1.23) (3.83)
Const ˆ βt−5 r
(Tot)
T (t−5,t) rI(Tot)(t−5,t)
13 0.772 0.285 0.010 0.095
(31.24) (12.08) (0.40) (3.09)
14 1.112 0.018 0.110
(22.68) (0.92) (3.14)
54Table 12: Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Return Standard Deviation on Tangi-
ble and Intangible Return Measures
Annual, 1968-1999, Coeﬃcients ×1000, Newey-West t-statistics in parentheses
This table reports the results the coeﬃcients (×1000) and t-statistics from of a set of Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regressions. The dependent variable in each cross-sectional regression is ˆ σ(t,t+2), the estimated
standard deviation the excess return of the individual stock’s excess return from July of year t through
June of year t+2. The independent variables in these regressions are the lagged estimated excess return
standard-deviation, ˆ σt−5, estimated using returns from July:(t−6) through June:(t−4); bmt, the book-
to-market ratio as of the end of December:(t−1); bmt−5, the book-to-market ratio as of the end of
December:(t−6); and rBV (t−5,t), rT(B)(t−5,t), rI(B)(t−5,t), the book-return, and the tangible and
intangible returns using book, calculated as described in the text. Measures using Sales, Cashﬂow, and
Earnings are calculated similarly. We perform annual cross-sectional regressions from t = 1968 through
1999. Standard errors are calculated using a Newey-West procedure with 11 lags.
Const ˆ σt−5 bmt bmt−5 rBV(t−5,t) rT(B)(t−5,t) rI(B)(t−5,t)
1 13.461 121.819 -0.712
(46.69) (6.33) (-1.62)
2 14.218 116.513 -0.987 -1.271
(44.66) (6.22) (-1.74) (-5.41)
3 14.548 111.443 -1.527 0.402
(20.58) (5.34) (-2.23) (1.68)
Const ˆ σt−5 spt spt−5 rSLS(t−5,t) rT(S)(t−5,t) rI(S)(t−5,t)
4 13.670 122.315 0.375
(33.51) (6.14) (1.53)
5 13.848 119.078 0.197 0.043
(31.39) (6.16) (0.58) (0.30)
6 13.628 112.555 0.303 -0.512
(28.24) (5.09) (1.05) (-2.28)
Const ˆ σt−5 cpt cpt−5 rCF(t−5,t) rT(C)(t−5,t) rI(C)(t−5,t)
7 10.389 118.805 -1.304
(16.69) (5.80) (-7.67)
8 10.971 116.389 -1.178 -0.537
(13.21) (5.52) (-4.01) (-5.37)
9 13.897 109.685 -1.167 1.004
(66.30) (4.59) (-4.66) (6.30)
Const ˆ σt−5 ept ept−5 rERN(t−5,t) rT(E)(t−5,t) rI(E)(t−5,t)
10 9.435 116.821 -1.454
(18.02) (5.60) (-12.04)
11 9.784 115.106 -1.435 -0.430
(11.07) (5.53) (-5.37) (-6.66)
12 13.901 108.374 -1.270 1.266
(66.52) (4.49) (-6.45) (5.73)
Const ˆ σt−5 rT(Tot)(t−5,t) rI(Tot)(t−5,t)
13 13.031 112.655 -0.344 0.768
(115.96) (4.48) (-1.27) (4.32)
14 14.584 -0.268 0.927
(31.89) (-0.87) (4.14)
55Table 13: Results from Time-Series Regressions of Value-Weighted Portfolio
Returns on Sets of Factor-Mimicking Portfolios
1968:07-2001:12, All Months, t-statistics in parentheses
This table reports the results of time-series regressions of three zero-investment portfolio returns on
benchmark portfolio returns. The dependent variables in Panel A, B and C are, respectively, the time
series of value-weighted coeﬃcients from the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly returns
on (A) rI(B) as in Table 4, regression 3; (B) ι(t−5,t) in univariate cross-sectional regressions as in Table
9, regression A; and (C) ι(t − 5,t) in univariate cross-sectional regressions with bmt−5, rB(t−5,t), rI(B)
as in Table 9, regression 3. The value-weighting of the coeﬃcients is described in Section VI.B of the
text.
The independent variables in regressions 2 and 3 in each panel are the contemporaneous monthly excess
market return, SMB and HML zero-investment portfolio returns, obtained from Kenneth French.
OLS t-statistics are reported in parentheses below each of the coeﬃcients. The ﬁnal column reports R2s
(in %) for each of the the time series regressions. All coeﬃcients are ×100.
Panel A: Intangible Portfolio Return
ˆ α ˆ βMkt ˆ βSMB ˆ βHML R2(%)
1 -0.363
(-2.04)
2 -0.440 0.177 5.3
(-2.53) (4.73)
3 0.176 -0.074 -0.377 -1.066 74.4
(1.89) (-3.33) (-13.04) (-32.18)
Panel B: Issuance Portfolio Return
ˆ α ˆ βMkt ˆ βSMB ˆ βHML R2(%)
4 -0.469
(-3.38)
5 -0.625 0.357 35.7
(-5.60) (14.91)
6 -0.462 0.227 0.217 -0.275 52.8
(-4.71) (9.69) (7.11) (-7.86)
Panel C:
Issuance Portfolio Return - Orthogonalized
ˆ α ˆ βMkt ˆ βSMB ˆ βHML R2(%)
7 -0.335
(-2.77)
8 -0.458 0.281 28.8
(-4.45) (12.72)
9 -0.465 0.231 0.263 0.019 40.6
(-4.84) (10.06) (8.79) (0.54)
56